Archiv für Januar, 2013


„At Tabari war kein Muqallideen „ist eine Lüge, weil im Ahlul Fiqh al Ahlul Iraq wird Imam Ibn Jarir at Tabari rah als hanafi Gelehrter aufgeführt,Quelle : Imam Muhammad Zahid akl Kawthari rah, überliefert von einem lebenden Hanafi Gelehrten .

Advertisements

Die ignorante und gleichgeschaltete westliche Presse und die Verlogenheit westlicher Außenpolitik in Afrika und der islamischen Welt:
Weinendes-Kind-320

„…Durch nahezu alle Berichte deutscher Medien ziehen sich zwei Argumentationslinien, die den „Gegenschlag“ Frankreichs begründen und befürworten. Zum einen ist die Rede vom „islamistischen Terrorismus“. Tatsächlich gibt es – neben anderen Aufständischen – auch Islamisten in Mali, die sich gegen die Regierung erhoben haben. Und schon weiß der seit langem auf Terrorismus geschulte Redakteur, dass hier nur der kurze Prozess, die militärische „Mission“ (Intervention, Operation oder Einsatz kommen als Verschleierungsbegriffe auch gern vor) helfen kann. Können die Redaktionen nicht lernen oder wollen sie nicht?…

Das zweite verlogene Argument ist das der Demokratisierung. Warum ausgerechnet jene Länder, die in Afrika und im arabischen Raum in der Vergangenheit wie die Sau gehaust haben und noch immer ihren Rohstoff-Vorteil dort suchen und finden, in diesen Gegenden die Demokratie etablieren sollten, ist schleierhaft. Auch im Fall Mali gilt die aktuelle Regierung, die sich mit der gütigen Genehmigung der Franzosen eingerichtet hat, als demokratisch. Wie das mit dem Mord an etwa 50.000 Tuaregs zu vereinbaren ist, der von Milizen (Ganda Koi) verübt wurde, die in den 90ern von Kräften organisert wurden, die heute die Regierung stellen, mögen uns die Demokratiespezialisten nicht erklären. So wenig wie sie ihren Lesern und Zuschauern die idiotischen, mit dem Lineal gezogenen Kolonialgrenzen erklären wollen, unter denen besonders nomadische Völker wie die Tuareg zu leiden haben und die Dauerursache für afrikanische Kriege sind.
Why do Arab scholars praise Deobandis

Es ist die Mischung aus europäischer Ignoranz, dämlicher Besserwisserei und Regierungsfrömmigkeit, mit der in den Medien der deutsche Außenminister ohne jeden Widerspruch zitiert wird: „Der Einsatz Frankreichs in Mali ist notwendig, er ist richtig und er ist auch vom Völkerrecht gedeckt.“ Das Völkerrecht hat in Mali gerade Urlaub und die von Westerwelle bereits zugesagte logistische Unterstützung der französischen Armee ist die reine Zuhälterei für einen immer noch kolonialistischen Krieg. Deshalb müsen die Sub-Zuhälter in den Redaktionen auch nicht nachdenken, wenn sie den französischen Außenminister zitieren, der mal wieder einen kleinen Krieg weissagt, der nur eine „Frage von Wochen“ sein würde. Sollten die Kriege in Afghanistan und Libyen nicht auch von kurzer Dauer sein? Egal, wer da stirbt, ist doch nur so´n Ali aus Mali. Die einzelnen toten Franzosen allerdings werden jetzt schon sorgsam gezählt.“

Quelle: http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/regionen/Mali/gellermann.html
In Mali „schnell mal Krieg machen“, 16.01.2013 (Friedensratschlag)
http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de


Der heute lebende und hochgeschätzte Hanbali(nicht Salafi beeinflusste) Allamaah Sidi Musa Furber rahmatullah ta´ala sagte : “Die islamischen Bücher unterrichten sich nicht selbst ”


Sollte man zuerst Sunnah-Gebet von Fajr (Morgengebet) verrichten, wenn für das Pflichtgebet gerufen (Iqamah) wird?

Antwort aus dem Buch “Adillatu’l-Hanafiya min al-Ahadeeth Nabawiyya ‚ala Masail al-Fiqhiyyah” von Muhammad ‚Abdullah ibn Muslim al-Bahlawi:

Nach Hanafi Madhab sollte man, auch wenn Iqamah ausgerufen und die Menschen mit den Gebet angefangen haben, zu erst Sunnah beten.

Wenn jemand als gegen Beweis diesen Hadith bringt:

عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ، عَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ، قَالَ: إِذَا أُقِيمَتِ الصَّلَاةُ فَلَا صَلَاةَ إِلَّا الْمَكْتُوبَةُ

Über Abu Hurayra vom Prophet Salallahu ‚Alayhi wa Sallam, er sagte: „Wenn für das Gebet Iqama gemacht wird, so gibt es kein Gebet außer das Plichtgebet.“
(Sahih Muslim, Nr. 710; Sunan at-Tirmidh, Nr. 321; Sunan an-Nasai, Nr. 860; Sunan Abu Dawud, Nr. 1266; Sunan ibn Majah, Nr. 1151; Sunan ad-Darimi, Nr. 1448; Musnad Imam Ahmad, Nr. 9873)

Nach den Hanafi Gelehrten ist die Sunnah Gebet von Fajr davon abgeschlossen. Es gibt diesbezüglich ein schwacher Hadith:

وَقَدْ رُوِيَ عَنْ حَجَّاجِ بْنِ نُصَيْرٍ عَنْ عَبَّادِ بْنِ كَثِيرٍ، عَنْ لَيْثٍ، عَنْ عَطَاءٍ، عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللهِ صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ: “ إِذَا أُقِيمَتِ الصَّلَاةُ فَلَا صَلَاةَ إِلَّا الْمَكْتُوبَةَ، إِلَّا رَكْعَتَيِ الصُّبْحِ

Über Abu Hurayra (Radiallahu ‚Anh) vom Prophet (Salallahu ‚Alayhi wa Sallam), er sagte: „Wenn für das Gebet Iqama gemacht wird, so gibt es kein Gebet außer das Plichtgebet und die zwei Raka’a vom Morgengebet (damit ist Sunnah-Gebet gemeint).“
(as-Sunan al-Kubra von al-Bayhaqi, 4226)

وَهَذِهِ الزِّيَادَةُ لَا أَصْلَ لَهَا وَحَجَّاجُ بْنُ نُصَيْرٍ، وَعَبَّادُ بْنُ كَثِيرٍ ضَعِيفَانِ

Dieser Zufügung hat keine Grundlage. Hajjaj ibn Nusayr und ‚Abbad ibn Kathir sind schwach.
(as-Sunan al-Kubra von al-Bayhaqi, 2/679)

Doch es gibt mehrere Überlieferungen von Sahaba, die die Meinung von Hanafi Madhab unterstützen:

عَنْ أَبِي مِجْلَزٍ، قَالَ: دَخَلْتُ الْمَسْجِدَ فِي صَلَاةِ الْغَدَاةِ مَعَ ابْنِ عُمَرَ وَابْنِ عَبَّاسٍ رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُمْ , وَالْإِمَامُ يُصَلِّي. فَأَمَّا ابْنُ عُمَرَ رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُمَا فَدَخَلَ فِي الصَّفِّ , وَأَمَّا ابْنُ عَبَّاسٍ رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُمَا , فَصَلَّى رَكْعَتَيْنِ , ثُمَّ دَخَلَ مَعَ الْإِمَامِ , فَلَمَّا سَلَّمَ الْإِمَامُ قَعَدَ ابْنُ عُمَرَ مَكَانَهُ , حَتَّى طَلَعَتِ الشَّمْسُ , فَقَامَ فَرَكَعَ رَكْعَتَيْنِ

Über Abi Mijlaz, er sagte: „Ich trat zusammen mit Ibn ‚Umar und Ibn ‚Abbas (Radiallahu ‚Anhum) ins Masjid ein, in der Morgengebet-Zeit. Der Imam war am beten. Ibn ‚Umar (Radiallahu ‚Anhuma) begab sich in die Gebetsreihe, wobei Ibn ‚Abbas (Radiallahu ‚Anhuma) zwei Raka’a (Sunnah) betete. Danach betete er zusammen (hinter) dem Imam (das Pflichtgebet). Als der Imam den Salam aussprach, blieb Ibn ‚Umar an seinem Platz sitzen, bis die Sonne aufging. Dann stand er auf und betete zwei Raka’a.“
(Scharhu’l-Ma’ani von at-Tahawi, Nr. 2200)

Schaykh Muhaddith al-Bahlawi sagte:

رواه الطحاوي, وإسناده صحيح

„Überliefert von at-Tahawi und seine Überlieferungskette ist authentisch.“
(Adillatu’l-Hanafiya, S. 222)

حَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ خُزَيْمَةَ، وَفَهْدٌ , قَالَا: ثنا عَبْدُ اللهِ بْنُ صَالِحٍ، قَالَ: حَدَّثَنِي اللَّيْثُ، قَالَ: حَدَّثَنِي ابْنُ الْهَادِ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ كَعْبٍ، قَالَ: خَرَجَ عَبْدُ اللهِ بْنُ عُمَرَ رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُمَا مِنْ بَيْتِهِ , فَأُقِيمَتْ صَلَاةُ الصُّبْحِ , فَرَكَعَ رَكْعَتَيْنِ قَبْلَ أَنْ يَدْخُلَ الْمَسْجِدَ وَهُوَ فِي الطَّرِيقِ , ثُمَّ دَخَلَ الْمَسْجِدَ فَصَلَّى الصُّبْحَ مَعَ النَّاسِ

Muhammad ibn Ka’b (Radiallahu ‚Anhu) sagte: „‚Abdullah ibn ‚Umar ging aus seinem Haus raus, sodann wurde für das Morgengebet Iqama ausgerufen. Daraufhin betete er auf dem Weg zwei Raka’a, bevor er ins Masjid eintrat. Dann trat ins Masjid ein und betete zusammen mit den Menschen das Morgengebet.“
(Scharhu’l-Ma’ani von at-Tahawi, Nr. 2202)

Schaykh Muhaddith al-Bahlawi sagte:

رواه الطحاوي, وإسناده حسن

„Überliefert von at-Tahawi und seine Überlieferungskette ist authentisch.“
(Adillatu’l-Hanafiya, S. 221)

حَدَّثَنَا فَهْدٌ، قَالَ: ثنا أَبُو نُعَيْمٍ، قَالَ: ثنا مَالِكُ بْنُ مِغْوَلٍ، قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ نَافِعًا، يَقُولُ: أَيْقَظْتُ ابْنَ عُمَرَ رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُمَا لِصَلَاةِ الْفَجْرِ , وَقَدْ أُقِيمَتِ الصَّلَاةُ , فَقَامَ فَصَلَّى الرَّكْعَتَيْنِ

Malik ibn Mighwal sagte: Ich hörte Nafi‘ sagte: „Ich weckte Ibn ‚Umar (Radiallahu ‚Anh) zum Morgengebet auf. Es wurde für das Gebet Iqama ausgerufen. So stand er auf und betete zwei Raka’a.“
(Scharhu’l-Ma’ani von at-Tahawi, Nr. 2203)

Schaykh Muhaddith al-Bahlawi sagte:

رواه الطحاوي, وإسناده صحيح

„Überliefert von at-Tahawi und seine Überlieferungskette ist authentisch.“
(Adillatu’l-Hanafiya, S. 221)

حَدَّثَنَا أَبُو بِشْرٍ الرَّقِّيُّ، قَالَ: ثنا أَبُو مُعَاوِيَةَ، عَنْ مِسْعَرٍ، عَنْ عُبَيْدِ بْنِ الْحَسَنِ، عَنْ أَبِي عُبَيْدِ اللهِ، عَنْ أَبِي الدَّرْدَاءِ أَنَّهُ كَانَ يَدْخُلُ الْمَسْجِدَ وَالنَّاسُ صُفُوفٌ فِي صَلَاةِ الْفَجْرِ , فَيُصَلِّي الرَّكْعَتَيْنِ فِي نَاحِيَةِ الْمَسْجِدِ , ثُمَّ يَدْخُلُ مَعَ الْقَوْمِ فِي الصَّلَاةِ

Abu ‚Ubaydillah berichtete von Abu’d-Darda (Radiallahu ‚Anh), dass er ins Masjid eintrat, während die Menschen aufgereiht im Morgengebet standen. So betete er in der Ecke des Masjids zwei Raka’a. Danach trat er zum Gebet ein, zusammen mit dem Volk.
(Scharhu’l-Ma’ani von at-Tahawi, Nr. 2205)

Schaykh Muhaddith al-Bahlawi sagte:

رواه الطحاوي, وإسناده صحيح

„Überliefert von at-Tahawi und seine Überlieferungskette ist authentisch.“
(Adillatu’l-Hanafiya, S. 221)

حَدَّثَنَا ابْنُ إِدْرِيسَ، عَنْ مُطَرِّفٍ، عَنْ أَبِي إِسْحَاقَ، عَنْ حَارِثَةَ بْنِ مُضَرِّبٍ، أَنَّ ابْنَ مَسْعُودٍ، وَأَبَا مُوسَى، خَرَجَا مِنْ عِنْدِ سَعِيدِ بْنِ الْعَاص فَأُقِيمَتِ الصَّلَاةُ فَرَكَعَ ابْنُ مَسْعُودٍ رَكْعَتَيْنِ ثُمَّ دَخَلَ مَعَ الْقَوْمِ فِي الصَّلَاةِ، وَأَمَّا أَبُو مُوسَى فَدَخَلَ فِي الصَّفِّ

Harith ibn Mudarrib berichtete, dass Ibn Mas’ud und Abu Musa (Radiallahu ‚Anhuma) [das Haus] von Sa’id ibn ‚As verließen. Worauf für Gebet Iqama ausgerufen wurde. Ibn Mas’ud verichtete zwei Raka’a, danach trat er zum Gebet ein, zusammen mit dem Volk, wobei Abu Musa (davor) sich in die Gebetreihe begab.
(Musannaf ibn Abi Schaybah, Nr. 6415)

رواه أبو بكر ابن أبي شيبة في مسنفه, وإسناده صحيح

Überliefert von Abu Bakr ibn Abi Schaybah in seinem Musannaf und seine Überlieferungskette ist authentisch.
(Adillatu’l-Hanafiya, S. 221)

Quelle :
in Bala&Dmhwir: Der Weg zur Wahrheit

Veröffentlicht: 30. Januar 2013 in Uncategorized

Seeking Ilm

Ballandalus

„Acquire knowledge because doing so is good. Seeking it is worship. Reviewing it is glorifying God. Researching it is jihad. Teaching it to the ignorant is charity. Serving the scholars is a way of drawing near to God because knowledge is the path of ascension to the stations of Paradise. It is a companion in isolation and a comrade in distant lands. It speaks to you in solitude. It is a guide to prosperity and a shield against adversity. It beautifies one among friends and is a weapon against enemies. With it God elevates people and makes them guides and bellwethers of good. The scholars are people whose words are sought and whose actions are imitated. The angels long for the scholar’s company and comfort them with their wings. Everything, the fish of the sea, the beasts of the earth, the predators of the land and sea, and the cattle…

Ursprünglichen Post anzeigen 105 weitere Wörter


Hakim al-Ummah Mawlana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (may Allah shower His mercy upon him)] said, ‘I always give preference to ‘ulama’ over the Sufis [1], for they are the protectors of the religion and its boundaries. This is why I prefer that ‘ulama’ spend more time in teaching, lecturing, preaching or writing and issuing fatwas than remaining in solitude. This statement of mine is a rational one; otherwise, I have a natural love for the Sufis. Majalis-e-Hakim al-Ummat, p. 142 (Karachi: Darul Isha‘at) compiled by Mawlana Mufti Muhammad Shafi‘ Usmani

Sultan al Ulama al-`Izz on the Superiority of the Rank of the Awliya‘ Over That of the `Ulama‘
Sultan al Ulama Al-`Izz ibn `Abd al-Salam was asked in his Fatawa about the correctness of Qushayri’s and Ghazali’s saying that the highest level among Allah’s servants after Messengers and Prophets was that of saints (awliya‘), then that of the scholars (`ulama‘). He replied: Concerning the priority of the knowers of Allah over the knowers of Allah’s rulings, the saying of the teacher Abu Hamid (al-Ghazali) is agreed upon. No reasonable person doubts that the knowers of Allah… are not only better than the knowers of Allah’s rulings, but also better than those of the branches and the roots of the Religion, because the rank of a science is according to its immediate object… Most of the time scholars are veiled from their knowledge of Allah and His attributes, otherwise they would be among the gnostics whose knowledge is continuous, as befits the demand of true virtue. And how could the gnostics and the jurists be the same, when Allah says: „The noblest among you in Allah’s sight are the most godwary“ (49:13)?… and by the „erudite“ (`ulama) in His saying „The erudite among His bondsmen fear Allah alone“ (35:28), He means those who know Him, His attributes, and His actions, not those who know His rulings… A sign of the superiority of the gnostics over the jurists is that Allah effects miracles at the hands of the former, but never at the hands of the latter, except when they enter the path of the gnostics and acquire their characteristics al-`Izz ibn `Abd al-Salam, Fatawa, ed. `Abd al-Rahman ibn `Abd al-Fattah (Beirut: dar al-ma`rifa, 1406/1986) p. 138-142.

Do you see the Difference ?


By Dr. Muhammed Hashim Kamali

The Relative Value Of Ikhtilaf
Bursa

It is due mainly to the recognition and tolerance of disagreement among the ’Ulama over juristic issues that Islamic law is often described as a diversity within unity: that is, unity as regards basic principles, and diversity regarding details. A tangible manifestation of ikhtilaf in Islamic law is the prevalence of at least five different schools of jurisprudence which have survived to this day and have followers throughout the Muslim world. Islamic law has in fact nurtured a rich tradition of diversity and disagreement just as it has remained open to the influence of other legal traditions.

Having said this, however, we need to view ikhtilaf in conjunction with two other principles of Islam, namely tawhid, that is, belief in the oneness of God and the far-reaching Unitarian influence that it has on Islamic thought and institutions. Tawhid is the first article of the Muslim faith and a major theme of the Qur’an. There is only one God. Likewise, there is one Islam, one scripture, (i.e. the Qur’an) and one ummah (community) and one Shari’ah. A symbolic manifestation of this unity in faith is also evident from the fact that all Muslims pray in the direction of the Ka’bah. Unity in the essence of belief is not open to any level of compromise or ikhtilaf. The Qur’an (21:92) declares Muslims as one nation -ummatan wahidatan- which is at once the witness and guardian of its own unity in faith, and this is also true of the Shari’ah. We may have different schools and madhahibs, all incorporating equally valid yet different versions of the Shari’ah, but this level of plurality does not alter the fact that there is only one Shari’ah, which is manifested in the clear textual injunctions of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The madhahib that have emerged and survived in the course of centuries are the schools of Fiqh which have interpreted the Shari’ah in the light of the needs and realities of their time. None has claimed to be a Shari’ah unto itself, but interpretations of the same Shari’ah that is shared by all.

10_dcee8694a87b445c0653a3a71d14b3c5

Fiqh has been defined as knowledge of the practical rules of the Shari’ah pertaining to the conduct of a competent person (mukallaf), a knowledge that is derived from the detailed evidence (adillah tafsiliyyah) in the sources of the Shari’ah. This definition is self-explanatory on the point that Fiqh is primarily concerned with the practicalities of conduct, and not with the essence of belief; it is also clear that Fiqh is neither coterminous, nor identical, with the Shari’ah. It is a part of the Shari’ah, the part which is concerned with practical legal rules. In point of fact, the Shari’ah is wider than Fiqh as it comprises in its scope not only practical legal rules, but also dogmatic theology (‘ilm al-’aqa’id), and moral teachings (‘ilm al-akhlaq). The definition of Fiqh also tells us that the rules of Fiqh are derived from a detailed study and interpretation of the evidence that is found in the Qur’an and Sunnah. Fiqh is thus a derived knowledge; it is neither totally original, nor entirely based on personal opinion.{1}

The comments that I have made so far are meant to place ikhtilaf in its proper perspective. Ikhtilaf basically operates in the realm of Fiqh. The dogma of Islam and its moral teachings are not open to ikhtilaf. Even the slightest level of disagreement over the normative validity of belief in the essentials of the faith, its five pillars, for example, and the essence of moral virtue is not tolerated and the ‘ulama have spoken in no uncertain terms on this. The Unitarian (tawhidi) outlook and philosophy of Islam is truly very strong, but people tend to notice disagreement more often than consonance and agreement. It is also worth mentioning, perhaps, that in recent times we have seen signs of a gradual strengthening of the voice of unity among Muslims. There were times, for example, when the schools of law during the era of imitation -taqlid- were emphatic about their own identity to the extent of occasionally making a self-righteous assertion of their own interpretations of the Shari’ah. But it is interesting to note that many a prominent Sunni jurist of the present century writes on the juristic legacy of the Shi’i ‘ulama and appreciates their contributions in the spirit of objectivity and acceptance. Note, for example, the late Muhammad Abu Zahrah, a well-known jurist and a prolific writer on Fiqh and on the contributions of the major fuqaha’ of Islam, wrote a book on the life and works of the Shi’ite Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq, and his contributions to the legacy of Islamic scholarship. The voluminous Fiqh encyclopaedias that have appeared in the later part of this century have also adopted the same catholicity of spirit: The subject arrangement therein is alphabetical and their contents are not confined to the views of only the four leading Sunni schools of Islamic law, but also include the views of the Shi’ah Imamiyyah, the Zahiriyyah, the Zaydiyyah and the Ibadiyyah. The academic style and content of the information that is recorded in several of these valuable works bears no obvious vestige of the narrow scholastic bias of the earlier times.{2}

Ikhtilaf and Ijma’

asad.jpg

As we have already noted, ikhtilaf is accepted at the level of juristic interpretation only, and I shall presently elaborate on its origins and causes, but even at this level the two competing concepts of ijma’ and ikhtilaf need to be seen together, as the one evidently limits the intensity and scope of the other. I would have no difficulty in providing a ready answer to the question as to which of these two carries greater authority and weight. For we know that ijma’ commands normative validity as a proof and source of Islamic law, next to the Qur’an and the Sunnah.

Notwithstanding the difficulties that we now face over the feasibility of ijma’, in theory at least, it is the only binding proof next to the nusus (textual injunctions) that is known to Islamic jurisprudence. Ijma’ essentially embodies the collective conscience of the Muslim community, their agreement and undivided consensus over the correct interpretation of the text and propriety in ijtihad. An individual opinion and ijtihad, however authoritative and sound, is not binding on anyone, and everyone enjoys the liberty to have an opinion, and so disagreement is naturally expected before an ijma’ materialises over a particular ruling. For ijtihad can hardly be visualised without disagreement and it is, in this sense, another name for ikhtilaf. But ikhtilaf, which is acceptable at this level, must meet two basic requirements, one of which is that each of the opposing views is based on valid evidence, and the other that none of the opposing views leads to what is unfeasible, or entirely unrealistic. Disagreements which fail to meet these requirements have no credibility and should be abandoned{3}. These two conditions also differentiate ikhtilaf from what is known as khilaf, that is unreasonable disagreement. It thus appears that ikhtilaf must have a basis in ijtihad in that it is supported by valid evidence.

A great deal of what is known by the name of ijma’ begins with ijtihad, and disagreement in ijtihad is not only tolerated but considered to be beneficial. If the issue over which ijtihad is exercised is important to the community as a whole, then it calls for general consideration and scrutiny by the ‘ulama and mujtahidin. Two possibilities can then be envisaged: the individual mujtahid is not supported by ijma’, in which case it remains an isolated opinion, or else it is elevated to the rank of ijma’ when general consensus materialises In its support. In this process ikhtilaf is tolerated as a matter of principle and no one is entitled to pressurise a scholar, a jurist or a mujtahid so as to prevent him from expressing opinions in accordance with his true convictions. But when there is general consensus over a particular ruling ikhtilaf must come to an end, and-the scholar or mujtahid who might have a different opinion is expected, like everyone else, to abandon his opinion and follow the ruling of ijma’. This is precisely what is meant when we say that ijma’ is a binding proof. The raison d’être of ijma’ is clearly to put an end to ikhtilaf and ultimately to vindicate the outlook and spirit of unity that is of central importance in Islam.

Causes Of Ikhtilaf

Disagreements among the ‘Ulama are caused by a variety of factors which may be summarised into three: (1) disagreement over linguistic matters that relates to the understanding and interpretation of the relevant text; (2) disagreement over the knowledge and authenticity of ahadith relevant to a subject; and (3) disagreement over the proofs and principles of Usul al-Fiqh. The first of these, that is, differences over interpretation was known during the lifetime of the Prophet, and those questions which were brought to his attention were clarified by the Prophet himself. But the ‘Ulama have noted numerous instances in the text of the Qur’an and Sunnah on which no clear information is recorded from the Prophet (peace be on him) or the Companions and the matter therefore remained subject to interpretation and ikhtilaf. Outside the definitive injunctions of the Qur’an, in the areas of speculative and general (zanni and ‘amm) rulings of the text, they still remain open to interpretation even if they have received an interpretation in the valid precedent. It may be stated as a matter of principle that disagreement is not valid over clear and decisive texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah. But as we have. noted above the Qur’an contains words and sentences that remain open to interpretation. Disagreements over the meaning of a word may be due to the occurrence of homonyms which carry more than one meaning. The word quru’ (2:228), for example, has more than one meaning. The text in question is concerned with the waiting period (‘iddah) of a divorced woman, which she must observe before she marries again. Her ‘iddah consists of three quru’, which could mean either three menstruations (hayd) or three clean periods (tuhr) between menstruations. The latter meaning would actually imply four menstruations and, therefore, a longer waiting period. The Companions differed over this and some among them, including ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, ‘A’isah and Zayd ibn Thabit held the latter meaning whereas ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab and ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas’ud held the former. The ‘ulama of Iraq, including the Hanafis, have followed ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab’s interpretation whereas the majority of the ‘ulama of Hijaz, including the Shafi’is. have followed ‘Uthman and ‘A’ishah, and the ikhtilaf has remained unresolved ever since.{4}

To illustrate disagreements over the meaning of words in the Hadith, I would refer to a hadith on the subject of divorce which proclaims that „no divorce nor manumission (can take place) in a state of ighlaq“ (La talaq wa la itaq fl ighlaq). While many have held that the word ighlaq means duress, others have held it to mean anger. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, concurring with his teacher, Ibn Taymiyyah, is of the opinion that ighlaq means obstruction of the faculties of awareness and purpose (insidad bab al-‘ilm wal-qasd) and has consequently held that divorce pronounced in a state of insanity, intoxication, extreme anger and even by an imbecile (maftuh) are all null and void.{5}

The word of the text may sometimes convey both a literal and a metaphorical meaning and there are instances of this in the Qur’an. For instance, in the context of ritual cleanliness, the ablution (wudu’) that is taken for obligatory prayers is normally vitiated in various ways, including physical contact with members of the opposite sex. The words that are used in the Qur’an are „… or when you touch women -aw lamastum al-nisa’- then you must take a fresh ablution“. The Hanafis understood the word lamastum to mean sexual intercourse, whereas the Shafi’is maintain both the literal and the metaphorical meanings of the word which means that wudu’ is broken not only by sexual intercourse but also by a mere handshake with the member of the opposite sex. The ikhtilaf of this question has also remained unresolved ever since.{6}

In a similar vein, the Qur’anic language oil the subject of commands and prohibitions is not necessarily value-specific. A word may occur in the imperative mood and it may convey either ail obligation (wujub), a mere recommendation (nadb), or even a permissibility (ibahah), which is far removed from the idea of a command. Thus the Qur’anic word fa’ktubuh (reduce into writing) transactions involving future obligations, or credit-based transactions (see 2:282) is linguistically a command but documentation here is generally held to be only recommended, not obligatory. Only the Zahiriyyah have held that the text here conveys an obligation and have consequently made documentation a requirement of every loan and deferred transaction.{7} We also read in the Qur’an command forms such as kulu wa-‘shrabu (eat and drink, 7:31) and also with reference to the hajj ceremonies it is provided that when you finish the hajj, then you [proceed to] hunt -fa’stadu- (5: 2). The words in both these examples only convey permissibility even though they are in the imperative mood.{8}

A prohibition (nahy) in the Qur’an may likewise convey a total ban, which is the normal meaning of a prohibition, or it may convey a mere reprehension (karahiyyah), or guidance (irshad) or indeed a host of other meanings, and the precise import of the words of the text is often determined by reference to supportive evidence in the Qur’an itself or the Hadith, and the ‘Ulama are not always in agreement over the conclusions they have drawn from their readings of the text.{9}

Another cause of ikhtilaf among the leading schools of law is due to the variation of localities, customary practices (‘urf) and cultural environments. The Hanafi madhab was developed in Iraq whereas the Maliki school was mainly developed in the Hijaz and they have each reflected the cultural leanings and custom of the society in which they had emerged. It is interesting to note, for example, that Shafi’is scholastic work was developed initially during the years of his residence in Baghdad, and subsequently in Egypt where he resided for several years. It is claimed that he found the customs of the Egyptians so different that he revised and changed a great deal of his earlier rulings, so much so that he is generally known to have developed two schools, the old and the new. Changes of time and place and developments in the customs and culture of society are not confined to these schools but are generally reflected in the works of the ‘ulama.{10} An ikhtilaf that originates due to cultural and customary differences is not always confined to minor issues as the scope of disagreement among schools and scholars often extend from specific issues to methods of reasoning, attitudes and perceptions over the basic evidence of the Shari’ah.

Another cause of ikhtilaf is the ignorance of a hadith, especially in the early period, that is, prior to the compilation and collections of ahadith in mid-third century Hijrah. Some of the disagreements that arose between the Traditionists (Ahl al-Hadith) and Rationalists (Ahl al Ra’y) related to-the fact that the scholastic centres of Kufah and Basrah in Iraq had not known some of the ahadith that were known in Makkah and Madinah. This would explain why the ‘ulama of Kufah resorted more frequently to ray and qiyas on issues over which they had not known of ahadith. Even the ‘ulama of Madinah were not at times well informed of the relevant hadith and resorted to Medinese practice (‘amal ahl al-Madinah) or to qiyas.

This-may be illustrated by reference to the hadith concerning the option of contractual session (khiyar al-majlis), which neither Abu Hanifah nor Malik, the leaders respectively of the Ahl al-Ra’y and Ahl al-Hadith, had implemented in their rulings on the matter. The reason for this is that the hadith in question was either not known to them or that they had known it but did not consider it reliable enough since it was a solitary hadith and was not widely known to them to rely on it. Malik referred the issue to the Medinese practice which did not correspond with the hadith. But when subsequent investigation tent support to the hadith and the fact that it was recorded by both Bukhari and Muslim as a marfu’ hadith (i.e. hadith that goes back to the Prophet), it was generally followed by the majority of the madhahib, except for the Maliki madhhab, which still disagreed and upheld ‘amal ahl al-Madinah.{11} The hadith in question provided that „when two men negotiate a sale, each of them has an option to withdraw until they part company“. A mujtahid who had known a particular hadith, or had known it but considered it weak of authenticity, might have relied instead on a manifest -Zahir- text of the Qur’an or arrived at a ruling by way of analogy to the text. Another mujtahid might have known a more relevant hadith and the result would be differential conclusions over the same issue. {12} Another level of ikhtilaf that originates in a hadith relates to variation in the reports of different narrators of the hadith. A hadith is sometimes narrated by more than one narrator, one of which may have conveyed a fuller version than the other, or that one of them might refer to the efficient cause (‘illah) of its ruling and the other does not. The mujtahid may consequently consider one to be more reliable than the other and various possibilities of ikhtilaf can arise in such situations. The third cause of ikhtilaf that is known to the ‘ulama’ is over the same issue.

If methodology and principles of Usul al-Fiqh. Considerable differences have arisen among schools over the acceptance or otherwise of a certain proof or principle of Usul al-Fiqh. There are differences, for example, with regard to juristic preference (istihsan) which the majority have accepted as a valid proof and source of the Shari’ah but which the Shafi’i have rejected altogether. Istihsan is the nearest Shari’ah equivalent of the doctrine of equity in Western jurisprudence and it authorises a judge and a mujtahid to find an alternative solution to an issue in the event where strict application of the existing law leads to rigidity and unsatisfactory results. And then with reference to ijma’ we note that the Malikis have held the Medinese consensus – ijma’ ahl al-Madinah- to be the most authoritative, or even the only valid form of ijma’. The majority on the other hand, considers ijma’ as an embodiment of the general consensus of the learned mujtahids of the Muslim community without it being necessarily confined to any particular region as such.

The leading schools have also differed over the authority of the fatwa of a Companion as a proof and basis of judgement (hukm). Whereas some have seen the verdict and ruling of a Companion as a true manifestation of the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be on him) and therefore authoritative. Others have disagreed and stated that the fatwa of a Companion is authoritative over something which the latter has narrated from the Prophet (peace be on him), but not otherwise. Similar differences of orientation have arisen over considerations of public interest -istislah- and custom -’urf-. The Malikis, on the other hand, are the main exponents of istislah, and the Hanafis of ‘urf, the other leading schools accept them each to a limited extent and the result is usually shown in their different rulings and conclusions over specific issues.
The scope of ikhtilaf over methodological principles also extends to rules of interpretation and the implied meaning of word forms such as the general and the specific (‘amm and khass). Compare, for instance, the position of the Hanafis to that of the majority – jumhur – on the implications of the general and specific rulings of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The general (‘amm) ruling of the text is definitive (qat’i) according to the Hanafis but it is speculative (‘amm) according to the majority (jumhur). One of the consequences of this would be that no conflict can arise between the ‘amm and the khass, according to the majority, since the latter will always prevail over the former. But since the Hanafis consider the ‘amm to be definitive – qat’i -, a conflict can arise between one qat’i textual evidence and another.

The madhahib have also differed over their methodologies of establishing the authenticity of a hadith, especially the solitary (ahad) hadith. It is a report of odd individuals, which remains below a mutawatir or a mashhur hadith. The Hanafi methodology concerning the ahad ahadith tends to be more stringent thereby precluding a chain of transmission, or isnad, in which there is weakness more rigorously than the other madhahib. For instance, the Hanafis prefer the manifest (zahir) of the Qur’an over the ruling of the ahad hadith. To illustrate this I refer to the subject of guardianship in marriage of an adult woman. The Hanafis- maintain that the adult female is entitled to conclude her own marriage contract, whereas the other three schools require the presence of the legal guardian (wali) to validate the marriage. The majority have relied on one of the ahad aha.dith which simply declares: „There shall be no marriage without a guardian“. The Hanafis have relied instead on the Qur’anic verse: If lie has divorced her, then she is not lawful to him until she marries (hatta tankiha) another man“ (2: 29). The occurrence of the Arabic word form tankiha in the feminine singular mode has enabled the Hanafis to conclude that an adult woman may contract her own marriage. The text here is characterised as zahir (manifest) in respect of guardianship as this is a secondary theme of the text, the main theme being that of divorce, which is why it (i.e. zahir) is considered a weaker evidence. Yet the Hanafis have preferred it to the hadith mentioned above, which, although definitive in meaning, is less than it in respect of authenticity and proof.{13} The Hanafis have also preferred the general (‘amm) of the Qur’an, and at times even a ruling based on analogy (qiyas), to a weak hadith. With reference to eating out of forgetfulness during the fast of Ramadan, for example, the Hanafis, unlike the majority, did not follow the hadith which exonerated this and allowed the person to Ignore it and complete his fast. The Hanafis instead held, by analogy, that a belated fast should be observed. The Malikis have generally preferred the Medinese practice to ahad hadith, and such differences of methodology have naturally had a bearing on the rules which the madhahib have derived from the available evidence.{14}

Etiquette Of Disagreement – Adab Al – Ikhtilaf

The science of Usul al-Fiqh is, from beginning to end, concerned with establishing a correct and effective methodology for ijtihad, and therefore also for ikhtilaf. Usul al-Fiqh is designed to encourage ijtihad in accordance with a set of guidelines. These guidelines go a long way to help distinguish acceptable ijtihad from that which is arbitrary and excessive. For so long as we accept in principle the validity of ijtihad, we must also accept ikhtilaf within its valid parameters. The Qur’an and the Sunnah are generally supportive of rational enquiry into its laws, which is borne out by the fact that the Companions were actively engaged in discussing legal questions. They differed from one another on matters of interpretation and ijtihad but at the same time they tended to acknowledge and tolerate juristic ikhtilaf among themselves. Their method to resolve matters relating to ikhtilaf in ijtihadi issues was by having recourse to consultation – shura – which is a Qur’anic principle and the Prophet (peace be on him) had regularly resorted to it himself. But before they resorted to shura, the Companions normally referred to the Qur’an and the Sunnah, in search of solutions to issues. Only, In tile absence of a clear ruling in the text did the Companions resort to shura and ijtihad. The following hadith is often quoted as a theoretical basis for legitimating ijtihad: „When a Judge exercises ijtihad and gives a right judgement, lie will have two rewards, but if lie errs in his judgement lie will still have earned one reward“.{15}

In addition to providing the basic ground for ijtihad, this hadith also encourages tile spirit of tolerance in academic endeavour by promising a reward even for one who might have inadvertently fallen into error. Since the hadith has taken a positive view of such efforts, other scholars and fellow mujtahids are also required-to exercise restraint in denouncing a view which they might consider erroneous. This hadith also lends support to the conclusion that a judicial decision that is made in the true spirit of ijtihad is enforceable and the judge may not be taken to task for it if it later turns out that lie had made an error of judgement. Similarly, when a person trusts the integrity and knowledge of a scholar of the Shari’ah and acts upon. his verdict (fatwa) on a legal question but later discovers that the fatwa was erroneous, he would have committed no wrong, simply because the hadith exonerates all error of that kind in the first place.{16} The reward that is promised in this hadith is, however, earned by judges and mujtahids whose sincerity and devotion to a good cause are not in question.

The Prophet (peace he on him) also directed his Companions to avoid disagreement that is purposeless and destructive. ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar has reported that oil one occasion the Prophet (peace be on him) heard two people arguing over a verse of the Qur’an apparently on some minor points such as accentuation and vowelling. The Prophet (peace be on him) heard their arguments and came out evidently angered with the kind of ikhtilaf in which they were engaged and said: „Verily people were destroyed before you for (their excessive) disagreement over the scripture“{17}
Yet on another occasion when a similar disagreement had arisen over the recitation of a portion of the Qur’an, the Prophet (peace be on him) noted the sincerity of the disputants and addressed them in these words: „Both of you are well-meaning“. He, however, warned them to „avoid (excessive) disagreement. For people before you were destroyed because of that“.{18}

This hadith is quoted by al-Bukhari in a chapter bearing the title „Karahiyyat al-Ikhtilaf “ (the Reprehensibility of ikhtilaf) which evidently portrays an image of how al-Bukhari viewed ikhtilaf. The expression halaka (they were destroyed) occurs in both tile ahadith referred to above. Ikhtilaf can, in other words, be destructive even if the parties might mean well.
arieties And Style

The ‘ulama have classified ikhtilaf Into three varieties of praiseworthy -mahmud-, such as disagreement with the advocates of heresy and misguidance; blameworthy or madhmum, of the kinds mentioned in the ahadith cited above; and one which falls between the two. This last variety of ikhtilaf is the more difficult of all the three types as it involves ambiguity and confusion that can be misleading, and may therefore demand greater effort to identify its pitfalls. Be that as it may, the hallmark of the distinction between the praiseworthy and blameworthy ikhtilaf is sincerity and devotion, or the lack of it, as the case may be. Whether the purpose is a worthy one, such as the advancement of sound ijtihad, or one which is tainted with selfish interest and caprice is likely, in the final analysis, to play a crucial role in determining the merit or demerit of ikhtilaf.{19}

In his Risalah, al-Shafi’i has divided ikhtilaf into two types: forbidden disagreement (al-ikhtilaf al-muharram) and permissible disagreement (al-ikhtilaf al-ja’iz). Disagreement is forbidden in matters which are determined by clear textual evidence in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be on him) for anyone who is aware of it. Al-Shafi’i then quotes in support the Qur’anic directive to the believers: „And be not like those who are divided amongst themselves and fall into disputations (ikhtalafu) after receiving clear signs“ (1105). God -the Most High- has denounced ikhtilaf in what has been regulated by clear evidence, which consists „either of a clear text of the Qur’an or the Sunnah or of analogy thereon“.{20}

As for matters on which the evidence is open to interpretation, which is the sphere of permissible ikhtilaf, al-Shafi’i refers to the general rules and guidelines of ijtihad which he has discussed in his Risalah with the proviso that priority should be given to supportive evidence that can be obtained from the Sunnah or by recourse to analogy -qiyas-.{21}

Ibn Taymiyyah has distinguished two levels of disagreement, namely substantive disagreement amounting to contradiction (i.e. ikhtilaf al-tadad) and disagreement of variance (ikhtilaf al-tanawwu’). The former usually consists of two views that are diametrically opposed to one another and they cannot be reconciled. The majority opinion on this type of disagreement is that only one of the opposing views could be right and declared as such but not both. Examples of this type of ikhtilaf among scholars are found on the question of freewill and determinism or in the views and doctrines of different factions of jurists and mystics. Tile matter is different in ikhtilaf al-tanawwu’ which consists basically of variant interpretations. one of which may be recommended while tile other is neither denounced nor falsified. This is where preference (al-tarjih) finds valid expression, simply because both sides rely oil valid evidence. In Ibn Taymiyyah’s assessment, by far the largest portion of ikhtilaf that has arisen in the Muslim community falls under the latter variety of ikhtilaf.{22}

The leading authorities of Islamic Jurisprudence are oil record in praising one another for their sincere contributions and have hardly, if ever, denounced One another for their differential opinions. They have, also urged their disciples not to be blind followers of the opinions of the founders of their madhab but to refer to the sources on which they had relied themselves. The leading authorities have all emphasised adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunnah as a matter of priority; then they counselled recourse to consensus (ijma’) and to analogy (qiyas) in the absence of a clear textual ruling oil a particular question.{23}

Ikhtilaf is a well developed area of Fiqh and works of scholarship on ikhtilaf date as far back as those of Fiqh itself. The first extant work of ikhtilaf known to us was by Abu Hanifah (d. 150) which bore the title Ikhtilaf al-Sahabah (Disagreement among the Companions). Then his disciple Abu Yusuf (d. 182) wrote a book entitled ikhtilaf Abi Hanfiah wa Ibn Abi Layla. Al-Shafi’i also wrote a book entitled Ikhtilaf Abi Hanifah wa’l-Awza’i; has a chapter on ikhtilaf in his Risalah; and has recorded in Kitab al-Umm his own disagreements with Malik on many issues. Ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 307) wrote a more general work on ikhtilaf entitled Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha’.

The style and content of these works have also changed over time. Initially the style of writing tended to be somewhat defensive and sought to vindicate one’s own views or school of following without expatiating in the works of the other madhahib, except perhaps where they differed from one another. Subsequent works on ikhtilaf such as that of Tabari’s Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha’ and Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi’s, Bidayat al-Mlijtahid tended to acquire a comparative style of writing, and later still, especially after the fifth century Hijrah, that is, following the decline of ijtihad, ikhtilaf works were influenced by regional developments and the focus was shifted to disagreements within the ranks of the schools. such as those between the leading imam and his disciples, or among the disciples themselves. Ibn ‘Abidin’s Radd al-Muhtar may be cited as an example of this approach. Another development of note in this context is that the writers began to indicate their preferable positions and there emerged a genre of juristic literature on preferences (al-tarjihat) which developed as an epiphenomenon of ikhtilaf.

Two works that merit special attention are that of al-Kasani’s Bida’I al-Sama’I’ and al-Mughni of Ibn Qudamah for their balanced comparison which highlights not only the disagreements but also the points of unanimity and agreement among the madhahib.{24}

Two Examples Of Ikhtilaf

I refer here to two examples of ikhtilaf which relate to disagreement over the interpretation of the textual directives of the Qur’an and the Sunnah respectively.

1. For an illustration of juristic ikhtilaf, I refer first to the differential rulings of the titadhahib on the revocation of a gift (al-ruju’ fi’l-hibah) prior to delivery. Malik and the ‘ulama of Madinah have held that it was not permissible and the only exception to this was a gift by one’s parents (father and mother) who were entitled to revoke a gift they had given to their offspring during their lifetime. Ahmad ibn Hanbal and the Zahiri school have held, on the other band, that it is not permissible for anyone to revoke a gift. Abu Hanifah has held the opposite view which entitles everyone to revoke a gift except when it is granted to a close relative who happens to be within the prohibited degrees of marriage. A general consensus seems, on the other hand, to have developed to the effect that no one may revoke a gift which was intended as a charity for the sake of gaining the pleasure of God.

The basic ground of disagreement here consists of two ahadith, one of which declares that „one who revokes a gift is like a dog that turns back on its vomit{„25,} and the other hadith, on the authority of Tawus which provides that „it is not permissible for the donor of a gift to revoke it except in the case of the father{„26.} The mother’s position is said to be analogous to that of the father. Shafi’i is reported to have said: „Had the hadith of Tawus reached me (through reliable) isnad, I would have ruled upon it“. As for the view that generally validates revocation of a gift except when the donee is a close relative, it is based on a report from the Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Kbattab who has been quoted to the effect that „a gift granted to a close relative, or by way of-charity, may not subsequently be revoked“.

A general reference has also been made in this connection to the moral enormity of revoking a gift, and the hadith in which the Prophet (peace be on him) has said that I have been sent in order to accomplish what is morally virtuous{„27.} The jurists have resembled a gift prior to delivery to a promise (al-wa’d) which entails only a moral responsibility but which cannot legally be enforced. The only exception here is a gift that is intended as charity and the exception here has been endorsed by general consensus -ijma’-.
The majority of jurists have held that when the father gives a gift to his son and then the son dies after receiving the gift, the father may receive it back through inheritance. It is reported that during the Prophet’s time, a man of the Anshar from Khazraj tribe had given gift of a garden to his parents and then the parents died leaving the same property in their estate. The matter was brought to the Prophet’ s attention whereupon lie said: „You have earned the reward for your charity and you may now take it back by way of inheritance{28}“. It thus appears that taking the gift back through inheritance, or indeed after a lapse of time when the return is by mutual agreement, is not apprehended. The moral enormity attached to the revocation of a gift is, as already stated, prior to delivery. For transfer of ownership of the gifted object is completed upon delivery and possession, and from that point onwards, the matter is no longer a moral issue, but governed by legal rules, which means that any subsequent transfer of ownership must be by mutual consent of the transacting parties.

2. To illustrate juristic ikhtilaf that originates from the variant interpretations of the words in the Qur’an, I refer to the verse on the type of divorce known as al-ila’. The verse in question provides:

Those who swear that they will abstain from intercourse with their wives should wait for four months. Then if they go back, God is surely Forgiving, Merciful. And if they resolve on a divorce, God is surely Hearing, Knowing (2:226).{29}

Ila’ typically occurs when the husband takes an oath of abstention, pledging he will abstain from sexual intercourse with his wife. Ibn ‘Abbas has stated that the pre-Islamic Arabs used to take such oaths frequently, and did so at times when the wife refused to comply with her husband’s demand over something, he would then take an oath that he shall not approach her. She was left in a state of suspense for one year, perhaps even two or three years, or even longer during which time she was neither a wife nor a divorcee{30}. Then this Qur’anic ruling came and set a limit of four months for the Muslims to determine the pbsition of their estranged wives one way or another after the completion of that period. Sa’id ibn al-Musayyab also explained that „when a man did not like his wife and yet did not wish to divorce her, he swore that he shall not approach her ever again … God Almighty then set a limit to this form of abuse{31}“. The above verse effectively declared that if the husband did not resume conjugal relations with his wife within four months. die wife shall be divorced. The rules of ila’ which tile jurists have elaborated also apply to instances of deliberate desertion of the wife by the husband without a valid excuse as I shall presently explain.

The Qur’an has laid down the basic terms of ila’ without providing details as to the specific terms of its application and this is where the jurists have disagreed widely as follows:

Abu Hanifah, Malik and their followers, as well as al-Awza’i and al-Nakha’i and many others have held that the Qui’anic terms of ila’ apply equally whether the marriage has been consummated or not, whereas al-Zuhri, ‘Ata’ and Sufyan al-Thawri have held that ila’ can only occur after consummation. The jurists have also disagreed as to the implications of the Arabic words fa-in fa’u (if they turn back) in the verse as it implies return from a state of anger, hence the interpretation, by many Companions, including All, Ibn ‘Abbas, Sa’id ibn Jubayr and many jurists of subsequent generations that ila’ can only occur when pronounced in a state of anger. The renowned Companion Ibn Mas’ud and numerous prominent ‘ulama, including Ibn Sirin, Malik, Shafi’i and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal have held -and this is the correct view- that like other varieties of divorce, ila’ can occur both in a state of anger and in the normal state. Ibn Rushd has confirmed this by saying that the words of the verse are general and specifying their import to the state of anger would need to be supported by evidence, of which there is none.{32}

The jurists have also differed regarding the time period which is actually mentioned by the husband when pronouncing ila’. There are four views on this:
(a) ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbas has held that ila’ occurs only when the husband swears that lie will „never approach her“ again.
(b) Abu Hanifah, his disciples, al-Thawri and the ‘ulama of Kufah have held that the period of ila’ is four months and a divorce occurs upon the expiry of this time unless the husband resumes marital relations before that time.
(c) Malik, Shafi’i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal have held that Ila’ does not occur unless the period actually exceeds four months. There may, in other words, be a pause, after the four months’ period, in which a decision has to be made on what to follow next.
(d) According to another opinion even a single day that is specified in the oath of abstention is enough to make ila’ come into effect.{33}

The reason for this disagreement is that the Qur’an has specified the waiting period for the wife but has not specified any period that the husband might mention himself. It is also stated that the word fa’u in the verse signifies sexual intercourse when there is no valid excuse on the part of the husband. But if the husband abstains for a valid reason such as illness, travelling or imprisonment, he may resume conjugal relations afterwards. Only when the excuse conies to an end such as by recovery from illness, or by release from imprisonment, and he still abstains from sexual intercourse, the spouses may be separated on ground of ila’.

A number of early ‘ulama including, Ikrimah, al-Nakha’i and al-Awza’i have held that the husband may revoke the oath of ila’, even when he is ill or in prison, by declaring his intention in words, in the presence of witnesses, and according to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, if the husband is unable to speak, he may revoke ila’ by gesture or even in his mind. Abd Hanifah is of the opinion that when unable to attempt sexual intercourse, the husband may just declare in words that I have returned to my wife“. But there is an opinion attributed to Sa’id ibn Jubayr that revocation of ila’(which is called al-fay’) does not occur except through sexual intercourse, even when the husband is on a journey or in prison.{34}

Then there is also the question of expiation (kaffarah) which the husband needs to make, for breach of oath, when he returns to his wife. There are two opinions on this, one of which maintains that the position here is analogous to breaking any other oath and the normal kaffarah for a breach of oath would apply. Thus when a man says to his wife: „By God I shall not speak to you“ and then he speaks, or says: „By God I shall not approach you“ and then he does, he is in breach of his oath and therefore liable to kaffarah. The second opinion on this question is that no kaffarah is necessary, and this is because of the wording of the verse that „… If they go back, God is surely Forgiving, Merciful“ (2:266). Others have held that the reference to mercy and forgiveness here is general and does not absolve the husband from the kaffarah.{35}

The ‘Ulama have also differed over the interpretation of the phrase in the said verse which refers to a divorce (talaq) that „if they resolve on a divorce -wa in ‘azamu ‘l-talaq…“- Does the divorce that ensues ila’ take place automatically or whether it occurs by means of a judicial decree? Many ‘Ulama have held, and this included the leading Companions, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, ‘Uthman, ‘Ali, ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas’ud. and ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abbas, and also several leading ‘Ulama including Suf`yan al-Thawri and Abu Harilifah to the effect that divorce follows automatically; that is, upon the expiry of the four month period.

There is also disagreement as to the nature of the divorce and whether it is a revocable or a final (raj’i) divorce. Many leading Companions, the majority of the madhahib and a number of jurists have held that if the husband does not resume marital relations with his wife, he must pronounce a divorce, otherwise the judge may order a revocable divorce. This is because all divorce in the Shari’ah is presumed to be revocable unless there is evidence to prove otherwise. Yet Abu Hanifah has differed from the majority and has held that the divorce that follows is final (ba’in).

The Maliki jurist Ibn al-‘Arabi has stated the Maliki position to the effect that When the husband deliberately abstains from conjugal relations with his wife with malicious intention – even though there is no valid impediment, such as illness, even if he has not taken the oath of abstention by way of ila’, his position is analogous to ila’. The wife may accordingly seek judicial relief, after four months of abstention, and the judge may then assign a time, as of the date of the complaint, for the husband to resume marital relations within that period, failing which the rules of ila’ will be invoked. For it is said that ila’ is not just a verbal pronouncement and may include anything that falls within its meaning, that is, any deliberate act of desertion that is intended to harm and humiliate the wife. Thus when a man swears that he shall not speak to his wife, or shall not support her and so on, and actually acts on his word while intending to harm her, his position is analogous to ila’ and the rules of ila’ apply to him. This is because the Qur’an has ordered the husband to live with them in fairness“ (4:19) and any act which is deliberate and harmful is enough to violate the Qur’anic directive on fair treatment{36}. While referring to this view, the well-known contemporary jurist, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has concurred, despite some disagreement that the ‘Ulama have recorded about it. There is a view, in particular, that the judge should not order a divorce and should merely advise the husband and admonish him to fear God and cease harming his wife. Al-Qaradawi has stated that if the conclusion is that the husband has violated the spirit of fairness as the Qur’an has decreed, then the judge must act in order to put an end to abuse.{37}
In both of the above examples, it can clearly be seen that all instances of ikhtilaf that the ‘Ulama have recorded are based on sound evidence and they therefore belong to the category of permissible ikhtilaf. I may add here that I have not cited the often-quoted hadith which proclaims that „disagreement of my community is a source of grace or mercy“ because of its doubtful authenticity. In his section on ikhtilaf in the Risalah, al-Shafi’i has not referred to this hadith nor is it recorded by al-Bukaari and Muslim, which is why some scholars have expressed some reservation about it. But supposing it were authentic, then grace or mercy (rahmah) can only be associated with ikhtilaf that is within its valid parameters and partakes in sound ijtihad.
onclusion

The existence of ikhtilaf as a well-developed and recognised branch of Fiqh is naturally indicative of a healthy climate of tolerance, among the leading ‘ulama and scholars of Islam. The fact that several schools of law have attempted to provide equally valid interpretations of the Shari’ah they have accepted one another and they, in turn, were accepted by the Muslim community at large. All this is a further evidence to the reality of pluralism in Islamic law.

It is also interesting to note that in the formative stages of Islamic jurisprudence -during the first three centuries- the scholars tend to excel in the degree of latitude and acceptance of ijtihad-oriented ikhtilaf. The Companions have disagreed about matters of interpretation and it is even said that they had reached a consensus on this: the agreement to disagree, and their example also finds support among the leading authorities and ‘ulama of the era of ijtihad. One might expect that the subsequent generations of ‘ulama would have preserved and even enriched this valuable heritage. Somewhat contrary to such expectations, however, the climate of understanding and openness was subsequently subjected to restrictions during the era of imitation (taqlid) where one finds instances of verging on rigidity and stricture among the lower ranks of the ‘ulama. To accept the plurality of the schools of law is indicative of healthy ikhtilaf. Hence, for a scholar/ imitator to claim total superiority of his school and take an over-critical and dismissive view of other schools is decidedly unsound and contrary to the original spirit of ikhtilaf.

Ikhtilaf has played an evidently important role in the development of the rich legacy of Fiqh and Shari’ah that will continue to provide a lasting source of influence. One can hardly overestimate the inspiring spirit of sound and principled ikhtilaf in our own generation. Yet ikhtilaf has a place in the legal and intellectual heritage of Muslims which should not be exaggerated. A legal order in society can simply not’ proceed on the basis of never-ending ikhtilaf. The value of ikhtilaf is therefore relative and not an independent to conformity and consensus that must clearly be accepted as the stronger influences which demarcate the ends of acceptable ikhtilaf. I say this partly because I believe that the madhhabi divisions in the present day Muslim ummah, especially between the Sunnis and the Shi’ah, and even among the students of different Sunni legal corpus often tend to violate the spirit of sound ikhtilaf. I have seen some Muslim youth in university campuses, some of whom-have associated themselves with partisan movements, to be restrictive and intolerant of even a mild degree of liberality and openness, or of conservative orientations, as the case may be, that they observe on the part of their peers and associates.

This I believe to be a far cry from the healthy precedent and example that has enriched the intellectual legacy of Islam, and merits constant attention, and dignified appreciation and respect. We can simply not afford to be intolerant of our differences and disagreements on various issues.

Yet we also need to be cautious about over-indulgence in ikhtilaf. Muslim individuals and scholars could perhaps afford to encourage ikhtilaf more widely in certain periods of their history when they enjoyed the confidence that was generated by the superiority of their political power and then a rigorously productive scholarship. But I believe that there is a great need today for Muslims to appreciate the value of unity and consensus while recognising in the meantime that unity and consensus which emerge out of open deliberation and principled ikhtilaf are what deserve our best attention. Ikhtilaf and consensus are often inseparable even if they appear to be at the opposite ends of one another.

To say that the Muslim community can totally eliminate disagreement and ikhtilaf over all questions is plainly unrealistic and has no historical precedent. The reality of living in a world where disagreements must inevitably exist is one which has dominated the greater part of Muslim history and it is no longer a matter of choice for the contemporary ummah. But then the question may still arise as to how should the Muslims cope with ikhtilaf on issues that they encounter from time to time. I propose to end this section with providing a tentative response to this question.

The substance of the response that I attempt here is basically the same as has been known to Islamic jurisprudence throughout the ages. The main thrust of the responsibility to resolve ikhtilaf accordingly falls on the shoulder of the ulu ‘l-amr, government leaders and those in charge of the community affairs. They must address and determine ikhtilaf by reference to the nature of the questions involved and the urgency or otherwise of providing a solution for them. Thus we read in a legal maxim of Fiqh the declaration that the „command of the Imam puts end to disagreement“ (amr al-Imam yarfa’ al-khilaf). The substance of this maxim is upheld in yet another maxim which simply provides that „the command of the Imam is enforceable“ (amr al-Imam nafidh.). It is a prerogative. therefore, of the lawful government and the head of the state to select for purposes of enforcement an interpretation or a ruling of ijtihad that is in the best interest of the community. There may be several interpretations of a particular text of the Qur’an or the Sunnah, or indeed a variety of non-textually based ijtihad relating to tile same issue, in which case the Imam is within his rights to select one in preference to others. In doing so, the Imam, or those in charge of such a selection, must act on the best interest and maslahah of the people. This is, in fact, the subject of another legal maxim which provides that the „affair of the Imam is determined by reference to maslahah“ (amr l-Imam maniut bi’l-maslahah). Once a maslahah- oriented selection has been made by the ruling authorities, everyone must comply with it: neither the mujtahid nor a layman is entitled to deviate from the command of the ulu ‘l-amr, as this is where disagreement must be laid to rest.

It is, accordingly, the responsibility of the ulu ‘l-amr to address issues of ikhtilaf that cause tension and disunity in the community generally as well as those that require urgent solutions. We know, of course, from the explicit terms of the Qur’an that the ulu ‘l-amr must resort to consultation, solicit expert opinion and counsel from the community itself, or even outside the community, if this proves to be necessary in order to resolve Ikhtilaf. Here we may refer once again to the Qur’anic directive which enjoins the believers to „ask those who have knowledge, if you yourselves do not know“ (16:43). The search for consultative and well-informed solutions and participatory decision by the ulu ‘l-amr thus summarise the Qur’anic directives concerning the determination of ikhtilaf.

Consultation in the present-day Muslim communities is conducted according to pre-determined procedures at the level usually of representative assemblies which normally uphold the majority opinion. When the authorities in charge and the ulu ‘l-amr have determined a disputed matter in the manner indicated. above, it becomes a hukni sharY and a duty therefore of the citizens to rally behind it and abandon ikhtilaf.

Experience may have shown that due to a high level of sensitivity, certain issues have become a continuous hotbed of tension in the community, and it is possible that the ulu ‘l-amr impose a total ban on all manners of disagreement and ikhtilaf over them. This is once again a legitimate exercise of the same authority that is vested in the ulu ‘l-amr. We note, for example, the provisions in the constitution of Malaysia which totally proscribe disputation and public statements on racial issues as this is proven to be a highly sensitive question in that country. One can find. of course, similar provisions on the limitations that the applied law. or the Shari’ah, might have imposed oil the freedom of speech which may, effectively put those issues beyond the realm of ikhtilaf.

To determine a correct procedure for the resolution of ikhtilaf in the present day Muslim societies, one should naturally refer to the constitution and laws of tile country or countries concerned. This also substantially means that we do not have a single formula, or a monolithic guideline, to provide us with a unified strategy for the resolution of ikhtilaf. Often we find that the Shari’ah, or the applied law of a given country, only provide us with general guidelines and leave specific decisions to be made by the experts or those who are in charge of community affairs.
What I have explored above may still leave us askance with regard to certain levels or types of ikhtilaf that the Muslims are experiencing today. Then we need to bear in mind that we have to live with some of the instances of unresolved ikhtilaf in juridical and even theological issues that history has left for almost every generation, and of which the present generation is no exception. This is also a function, to some extent, of the circumstantial character of ikhtilaf which tends to rise in relationship to new developments and unprecedented experiences. It must remain, by the same token, the responsibility of every generation of the ummah to seize the opportunities they may be endowed with, or which they have at their disposal, to pursue the quest for resolving ikhtilaf within the ranks of tile ummah, or else to find better ways of coming to terms with it.
——————————————–
Notes and References

1. Cf. Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani, Adab al-Ikhtilaf fi ‘l-Islam, 3rd ed. (Herndon Va: al-Ma’had al-‘Alami li ‘l-Fikr al-Islami, 1407/1987
2. Cf. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sabuni, et al, al-Madkhal al-Fiqh wa Ta’rikh al-Tashri’ al-Islami (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1402/1982), 360.
3. Cf. AI-‘Alwani, Adab ‘l-ikhtilaf, 104.
4. Cf. AI-Sabuni, al-Madkhal al-Fiqhi, 316.
5. Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Khatib al-Tabrizi-, Mishkat al-Masabih, ed., M.N. al-Albani, 2nd ed. (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1399/1979), hadith no. 3285; Sali ‘Ali al-Bahnasawi, al-Sunnah al-Muftra ‘Alayha, 2nd ed. (Kuwait: Dar al-Buhuth al-‘llmivyah, 1401/1981), 186.
6. The Qur’an, 5:6
7. Cf. Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Usul al-Fiqh (Cairo: Dar al-Flkr al-‘Arabi, 1377/1958), 75.
8. Cf. Abu lshaq lbrahim al-Shatibi, alMuwafaqat fi Usul al-Shari’ah, ed., Shaykh ‘Abd Allah Diraz, (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijariyyah, n.d.), 3: 88.
9. For Illustrations and details see the chapter entitled Commands and Prohibitions in Mohammad Hashim. Kamall, Principles of islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1991), 139-149.
10. Cf. Al-Sabuni, al-Madhkal, 314; Jamal al-Din‘Atiyah, al-Tanzir alFiqh (Doha: n. p. 1407/1987), 135.
11. Cf. Bahnasawi, al-Sunnah, 183.
12. Cf. Al-‘Alwani, Adab ‘l-Ikhtilaf, 110.
13. Kamali, Jurisprudence, 99.
14. See for details, Kamali, Jurisprudence, 71-79; Bahnasawi, al-Sunnah, 187.
15. Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, Sunan Aba Daud, Eng. trans. Ahmad Hasan (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1984), 3: 103, Hadith no. 3567.
16. Cf. Bahnasawi, al-Sunnah, 189.
17. Muhammad ‘Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, ed., Ahmad M. Shakir (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq, 1400/1980) 5: 66; al-‘Alwani, Adab al-ikhtilaf, 46
18. Ibnu Hajar al-Asqalani, Fiqh al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Cairo: Mustafa al-Halabi, 1378/1959), 13: 289; Tabrazi, Mishkat, Hadits no. 2212; alwani, Adab al-ikhtilaf, 47
19. Cf. Al-‘Alwani, Adab al-ikhtilaf, 28
20. „Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i, al-Risalah, ed., Muhammad S. Kaylani, (Cairo: Mustafa- al-Babi al-Halabli, 2nd. ed. 1403/1983), 245.
21. Ibid
22. Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah, Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim li-Mukhalafat Ashab al-Jahim, ed., Nasir A. al-‘Aql (n.p. 1404/1984), 124-134; see also for a discussion of ikhtilaf, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1997), 144-147.
23. Ibn Taymiyyah, Iqtida’, 91.
24. See for details ‘Atiyyah, al-Tanzir, 136-144; al-‘Alwani, Adab al-Ikhtilaf, 91-93.
25. Abu’l Walid ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi, Bidayat al-Mujtahid (Lahore: Faran Academy, n.d). 2: 249.
26. Ibid., see also for a discussion Jamal al-Din ‘Atiyyah, al-Tanzir, 144-145.
27. Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, 2: 250.
28. Ibid., 2: 250; ‘Atiyyah, al-Tanzir, 145.
29. See for an early and detailed discussion of this verse, al-Shafi’i, al-Risalah, 249-254 (sections 1705-1752). See also generally on ila’ Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, 2: 74-78.
30. Cf. Wahbah al-Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuh, 3rd printing (Damascus: Dar ‘l-Fikr, 1409/1989), 7: 536ff.
31. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Madkhal li-Dirasat al-Shari’ah al-Islamiyyah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1-411/1990), 181.
32. Al-Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Islami, 7: 545.
33. Al-Shafi’i, al-Risalah, 250 (section 1718); Ibn Ruslid, Bidavat al-Mujtahid, 2: 75.
34. Cf Abd ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Qurtubi, al-Jami’ li-Ahkam al-Qur’an, (also known as Tafsir al-Qurtubi) (Cairo: Matba’ah Dar al-Kutub, 1387/1967), 3: 109; al-Qaradawi, Madkhal, 1.84.
35. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi-, al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Cairo: al-Matba’ah al-Bahiyyah, n.d.), 6: 88; al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, 3: 111; Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, 2: 76-77; al-Qaradawi, Madkhal, 185.
36. Abu Bakr ‘Abd Allah Ibn al-‘Arabi, Ahkam al-Qur’an (Cairo: Dar al-Sa’adah, 1330 H), 1: 178; Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, 2: 76.
37. Al-Qaradawi, Madhkal, 186-187.


N DEFENCE OF IMAM AHMAD RAZA KHAN OF BAREILLY
BY: SAYYID SHAH ALE‘ RASOOL HASNAIN BARKAATI (SAJJADAH NASHEEN, MAREHRA SHAREEF, INDIA )

Lailahaillallah+Muhammadarrasulullah

Praise be to Allah and lots of Darood and Salaams upon the Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad Mustafa (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) whom Allah created as the Prophet of Prophets and made him His most beloved one. May Allah bless all the companions of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) and those who followed them and also those who have been following them till today and would go on following them till the Doomsday.

My brother in faith and a very intimate friend of mine Al Haj Salim Muhammad Barkaati from Preston (UK) has sent me an e-mail containing the absurdities uttered by one Ibrahim Adam. This man Ibrahim Adam seems to be an ignorant and illiterate man who is trying to get some cheap publicity through uttering such nonsensical things against one of the most celebrated Ulema of the world, Ala-Hazrat Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih), the Muhaddith of Bareilly.

The greatness of Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih) is evident from more than one thousand of his books written on over a hundred subjects (and not the topics). Imam Ahmad Raza Khan’s (rahmatullah alaih) Fatawa are spread over more than ten thousand pages and are a valuable treasure in the Sunni world.

Ibrahim Adam, the misguided, wretched and perverted scholar, in his lecture “THE BERELWIS AND THE TRUTH BEHIND THEIR FOUNDER” has tried to level false charges against Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) by misquoting his writings. I wonder how people listen to the lecture of Ibrahim Adam who cannot speak a single sentence with correct lexicon. He does not know the titles of the books written by Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih), which he has tried to misquote in his lecture. I throw a challenge to Ibrahim Adam to write correctly in Roman script the titles of at least fifty books of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih). Allah willing, the Wretched Moulvi Ibrahim Adam might not even know the total number of the books and treatise written by the great Muhaddith of Bareilly.

200430_10150111229955334_672380333_7053872_5021627_n

The very foundation of the criticism by Ibrahim Adam is shaky. The first paragraph of his lecture begins with the introduction of two Schools of Thought, which are most prominent in India. Ibrahim Adam’s affiliation with the Deobandi school is evident from his hyperbolic statement while referring to the Deoband school: “One is a huge and vast institution, which has produced most the Ulamas throughout the world, which is the Deoband institution.” What a poor language!

Ibrahim Adam has lifted an excerpt from the biography of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) entitled “Malfoozat”. He has made this excerpt the basis of his first criticism.

I think I should better quote Ibrahim Adam himself:

“The title is the saying, practicing and beliefs of Ahmed Raza Khan, the founder, patron, saint, and friend of the Berelwis. The school of thought follows.

Claim 1: Ahmed Raza Khan appeals that the Rasul of Allah (SAW) was his follower. He writes, When Barkaat Ahmed, a certain person from his group, passed away, Ahmed Raza Khan went to bury this man. He writes I descended into his grave, and I inhaled the fragrance in his grave, which I first inhaled at the grave shariff of Rasullullah (SAW). On the date Barkaat Ahmed died, the Late Maulwi Syed Amir Ahmed saw Huzoor (SAW) on a horseback in a dream, and this late Maulwi Syyed Amir Ahmed asked, “Yaa Rasullullah, where to at thou bound (where are u going). The Nabi (SAW) replied, I am bound for the Janaza Salaah of Barkaat Ahmed. Alhumdullulah, I Ahmed Raza Khan, myself did lead this mubaarak Salaah of Janaza.” Malfoozaat of Ahmed Raza Khan, Vol. 2, p.23.”

The basis of Ibrahim Adam’s criticism is his misinterpretation of the report. The entire episode is associated with a dream, which the late Maulwi Syyed Amir Ahmed saw. Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) quoted him to affirm his beliefs in the Hadith of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam): Whoever sees me in his dream, verily he sees me, as the Satan cannot take my form.

Ibrahim Adam (better, call him Molvi Ibham, which means ambiguity) has an objection: How Ahmad Raza became the Imam of the Janazah prayer in which the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) also participated? The most ignorant Moulvi Ibham has then referred to an episode from the life history of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam). When the Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) recovered from his illness and came out of his chamber, he saw Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddique (radi Allahu anhu) leading the prayers. The Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) was so overwhelmed by the very sight and tried to join the congregation. Hazrat Abu Bakr (radi Allahu anhu) felt the presence of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) and tried to shift from the prayer mat but the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) signalled him to stay where he was and sat by his side. Abu Bakr (radi Allahu anhu) continued the prayer. The experts of Hadith say that apparently Abu Bakr (radi Allahu anhu) was the Imam of the congregation but in fact the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) became the Imam of the Salaah. There is a general rule that the Prophet is always the Imam of the prayer, and this is related to all the Prophets. The concept of Imam and Muqtadi in the Janazah Salaah is different from that of the five-time obligatory prayers. For example, the Janazah Salaah is the only Salaah where the Jama’at does not break with the invalidation of the Wuzu of the Imam. One person’s performing of the Salaah is sufficient. Again, the Janazah Salaah is the only Salaah where the presence of a single person of good faith (Pure Sunni like Imam Ahmad Raza) among many persons of disbelief (like Ibrahim Adam) satisfies the obligation, the Farz-e-Kifayah. The Janazah Salaah is not a Salaah in its basic form; it is an invocation to Allah to bless the deceased. In that case, there is nothing wrong if Imam Ahmad Raza expresses his gratitude to Allah the Almighty who enabled him to attend the Janazah Salaah (or invocation prayer) of a fortunate believer where the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) was also present.

9529356

The Deobandi stooge Moulvi Ibham’s knowledge of Hadith is so limited that he does not know that the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) has performed Salaah behind….

Now we quote the second point of Molvi Ibham’s criticism:

“Claim 2:

1. Ahmed Raza Khan claimed from his writing “Prophethood will proceed again after Abdul Qadir Jilani, and this new prophet will be initially a follower of a sheikh,”Hidayha Baksheesh, Vol. 2, p.72.”

I once again throw an open challenge to Molvi Ibham to prove that Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) has ever written a Book entitled “Hidayha Baksheesh”. If he succeeds in proving this, he will get a reward of one lakh rupee cash in Indian currency. By the grace of Allah, Molvi Ibham will never ever be able to prove this.

Imam Ahmad Raza Khan’s (rahmatullah alaih) enemies from Deoband, Nadwah and Najd have always tried their level best to misinterpret his writings. The reason: they are unable to understand their meanings and annotations. Molvi Ibham is the latest addition to the array of Ala-Hazrat’s (rahmatullah alaih) critics. I find this man totally illiterate and to some extent a cynic. Dear readers! You can very well judge the idiotic approach of Molvi Ibham that first he reproduces some excerpt from a non-existing book of Ala-Hazrat (rahmatullah alaih) and then on the basis of that excerpt, concludes: This is why Ahmed Raza Khan regard himself from that moment on as Qadri, and all his followers are Qadrias. He is a Qadria Prophet. Any sensible man would easily make out the bad intentions of Molvi Ibham to distort the image of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan by attributing to him wrong and un-Islamic notions.

Molvi Ibham further tries to blemish Ala-Hazrat (rahmatullah alaih) by depicting him as a claimant of Prophethood. He quotes: “To keep on my deen, and on my Madhab, as theologized in my writings, instead fastly and solidly is a obligation above all other obligation,” Wasaayaa Shariff of Ahmed Raza Khan, published on the 25 of Safar 1345 AH. He says, those who believe in the berelwi school of thought must keep to his deen and his madhab, as he had written and as he had praised. His obligation fard over all other obligation.”

durood_Tujinaa

Dear Readers! Just look at the comments of Molvi Ibham after the quotes. Do you find any relevance? If Ala-Hazrat (rahmatullah alaih) advises his followers to stick to his faith, it would certainly mean that the followers should follow the faith that Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) himself was following. “To keep on my Deen”, as wrongly translated by Molvi Ibham does not mean that Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) is claiming himself to be the founder of a separate faith. One of the three questions in the grave which the Munkar-Nakir are going to ask will be: Ma Deenoka? What is your religion? Does it mean Mr. Ibham that the angels are asking the dead man, what faith have you founded. The question would obviously mean: What faith do you practise or follow? Most of the old Deobandi Ulema prefix “Hanafi” to their names. If you ask them they would say that they are the followers of Imam-e-Azam Abu Hanifa (rahmatullah alaih) and that is why using the title Hanafi. Imam Ahmad Raza Khan is the staunch follower of Hazrat Shah Abdul Qadir Jilani (rahmatullah alaih). Hence he assumed the title Qadri to show his allegiance to the great Saint of Islam.

Molvi Ibham quotes further:

“Ahmed Raza Khan has been appointed by Allah over the Ahle-Sunnies.” This is from Ramhul-Qahhar Al-Kufri Kuffar on p.6.

And Molvi Ibham cannot remain silent without giving his own comments. He says in his exotic language: “What Allah (SW) says about the Ambia Ikram,” Ahmed Raza Khan says, “Allah has appointed me.” No man, no Aalim, no Saint, Walliullah has the right to write this. To the berelwi, the word of Ahmed Raza Khan is more precious and sacred than the Qur’an and Hadith.

Look how he writes and what he writes, but the berelwis, prefer to remain blind. This is blind cultism, this is traditional fetishism, by emotion applause of Narre-Takbir and Allahu-Akbar and shouting to get attention by hypocritical adherence.

Dear readers! It is high time you buy a Webster’s English Dictionary to decipher the coded language of the great scholar who is out on a preaching spree by delivering absurd lectures and befooling the innocent men of faith. The Sheikh of Najd (Shaitaan) has appointed Molvi Ibham to criticize the Sunni Ulema who have been doing yeoman’s service in preaching and propagating the religion of peace in various parts of the world.

Molvi Ibham’s ignorance to Arabic language is at its height when he uses the abbreviation (SW) for Allah in the following excerpt. I wonder what does he mean by the expression “The Islam of Allah (SW)”? The Islam of Allah (SW) and Nabi is sufficient for all Muslim, is it not? Three claim has been used here, and this is the backbone of berelwi, who self-proclaim that they are the only Alhe-Sunnat wal Jamaat. The only reason people follow it, because it’s emotionalism, they equate spiritualism to emotionalism. The Alhe-Berelwi knows what’s going on, but they think being a berelwi is an easy way to go to Jannah and easy ticket to Jannah.

Molvi Sahib, I am grateful to you that you have ultimately realized the fact that Sunnis follow Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) because his teachings lead to the righteous path. The Barelwism, as you put it, is surely the shortest way to Paradise as it consists of the ways and traditions of the great Saints of old right from the Prophet’s (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) time. The Sunni Jama’at (or as you call it, the Barelwi) is assuredly the 73rd sect among Muslims whom the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) has given the glad tiding of an entry into Paradise. Molvi Ibham and his mentors the Deobandis, the Jama’at-e-Islami, the Wahabis, the Tablighi Jama’at cannot jointly claim to be the Jannati sect.

Molvi Ibham continues his wild guessing. One thing is certain that this Satanic junta led by Molvi Ibham is quite at home in fabricating stories. His Tabligh is totally based on hearsay. He does not bother to refer to the original books while quoting them. He even does not care to cross check his statements before making them public. These are the characteristics of shameless people who do not mind to be taken to task by the opposite group.

Molvi Ibham further levels charges against the followers of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih).

He says: “They proclaimed, “even the Nabi (SAW) listened to the sermons and the lactures of Abdul Qadir Jalani (RA).” Let’s get something correct. Abdul Qadir Jilani has lived long time a saint and a wali of Allah (SAW) who the whole ummat respects. They use his name to get the attention of all the Muslims. Ahmed Raza Khan, the originator of Berelwis writes: “What are Walies, what are Ambias, even the Huzoor (SAW) attends your majlis, to listen to your service of Ghous Paak (Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani (ra)) Hidaayat Bakshish, Vol. 2, p.7

“Flowers attend the sermons of Abdul Qadir, nay even the Prophets attend the sermons of Abdul Qadir Jilani Hidaayat Bakshish, Vol. 2, p. 71.”

I don’t understand as to what Molvi Ibham wants to prove by quoting all this. Has he not heard the famous Hadith-al-Qudsi: “Ana Jaleesu man zakarani”, which means, “I accompany the person who remembers Me”. Now, the Majlis of Huzoor Ghaus-e-Pak (rahmatullah alaih) was always full of the remembrance of Allah and His beloved Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam). We the Sunnis believe that the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) is present in every gathering, be it Salaah or Haj or Milad Shareef; he is present in every mosque; he is present in every Sunni’s house. Therefore, if the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) and Hazrat Khizr (alaihis salaam) etc. are present in the sacred gatherings of believers, there is nothing for the disciple of Shaitaan, Molvi Ibham, to lament upon. From which expression has Molvi Ibham concluded that attending the sermon of Ghaus-e-Pak (rahmatullah alaih) means becoming his follower or disciple? Has Molvi Ibham not read the biography of Huzoor Ghaus-e-Azam (rahmatullah alaih) in which it is clearly mentioned that when for the first time he stood upon the pulpit to deliver sermon, he could not utter a single word. He saw great Arab scholars were sitting to listen to him. He invoked Allah to grant him eloquence. His prayers were answered. The Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) appeared and embraced Ghaus-e-Azam (rahmatullah alaih) in affection and put his sacred saliva in his mouth. Then Hazrat Ali (radi Allahu anhu) appeared and put his saliva into his mouth. Suddenly Ghuas-e-Azam (rahmatullah alaih) felt the effect of the sacred saliva of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam). He started addressing the audience in chaste Arabic. The audience was astonished that a young man, who was stammering a little while ago, was so eloquent that the Arab scholars were unable to compete.

Molvi Sahib, why do you understand everything in its negative term? Is it not possible that the Awliya, the Prophets and the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) himself attended the sermons of Ghaus-e-Pak (rahmatullah alaih) to feel proud of him as well as bless him.

Dear readers! I would like you to peruse the following quotation and judge themselves the authenticity of the person who quotes it. “Ahmed Raza Khan writes, “The messenger of Allah are enjoining their wives in their grave. The wives of wives of Anmbias are presented to them Anmbias, and they enjoin their wives their in” Maalfoozaat, Vol. 3, p. 28.”

Molvi Ibham gathers the courage to ask: What kind of respect is this to the dignity of Nabi (SAW)? Berelwis claim to have a greater love and respect of the Nabi (SAW) then the other Muslims, but they will never go against the writing of Ahmed Raza Khan and the fatwas by their scholars. Any Berelwi, brother read this pages and think where they are going. It’s time to wake up.

Can Molvi Ibham tell us what kind of respect is the following to the dignity of Nabi (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam)? In the beginning of his lecture Molvi Ibham has mentioned: One is a huge and vast institution, which has produced most the Ulamas throughout the world, which is the Deoband institution. People coming from there are called Deobandi.

These so-called great scholars of the huge and vast institution of Deoband are the spiritual masters of Molvi Ibham. Let us see what respect have they shown to the Nabi (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam).

On page 51 of “Buraheen-e-Qati’a”, Khalil Ahmad Ambethawi says: “After looking at the condition of Satan and the Angel of Death, it can be gained that they possess a great depth of knowledge and this has been proven from the Qur’an and Ahadith. To prove such knowledge for Fakhr-e-Aalam (Muhammad Sallallaho Alaihi wasallam) without proof from the Qur’an and Ahadith, but from common sense, is a false thought. If, to do so is not a Shirk, then in which category of faith does it fall?”

On page 6 of “Hifzul Imaan”, (printed in Mazahirul Uloom), Ashraf Ali Thanawi says: “If knowledge of the Unseen refers to partial knowledge, then what speciality is there in Nabi (Sallallaho Alaihi Wasallam). Such knowledge is possessed by Zayd and Amr (any Tom, Dick and Harry), every child, insane people and all types of animals.”

On page 5 of “Tehzeerunnas” (published in Maktaba Fayz Nazd Jami Masjid Deoband), Qasim Nanotvi says: “Prophets are superior to their followers only in knowledge, but in good deeds, followers sometimes seem equal and occasionally even become superior to them.”

In part II, page 12 of Fatawa-e-Rashidiyah, (published Maktaba Rashidiyah, Jami Masjid Delhi), Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi says: “The word ‘Rahmatul-lil-Aalameen’ is not a speciality of Rasool (Sallallaho Alaihi Wasallam). But other Prophets, saints and great Ulema are also cause of mercy unto the worlds, even though Rasool (Sallallaho Alaihi wasallam) is the highest of them all. Therefore, to use this word on others, is also permissible.”

If one examines the original books that were written by these Deobandis, one will find other similar derogatory statements. Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih) sent many of the blasphemous and derogatory statements to the Ulema of Mecca and Medina Shareef for clarification. They did not hesitate in passing the Fatawa of Kufr against such people who insulted Almighty Allah and the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam).

Muhammad Saeed bin Baabseel, Mufti of the Shafeyi order in Mecca wrote: “After sending praise and salutations, I have seen that which that learned person and professional teacher has purely written. It is a struggle on behalf of the religion of Muhammad. In other words, my brother and my respected Hadrat Ahmed Raza Khan who in his book “Al Mu’tamadul Mustanad” has refuted the evil leaders of the false sects and false beliefs. Such people are worse than all evil, wicked and seditious people. Our author, in his book, has summarized and stated the names of those wrongdoers, who due to their wrong doings, are soon to become the worst and the lowest amongst the infidels.”

Muhammad bin Abdus Salam Daghistani, Mufti Madinatul Munawarah wrote: “O Readers! It is essential for you to hold on to this Kitaab which its author has written with great swiftness. You will find this book bright and evident proof in refutal of these groups. Especially those individuals who intend to undo the objective, which is already bound. Who are these individuals who are known as Wahabis? From amongst them is Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani who has claimed Prophethood, and the other ones who have come out of Deen and insulted the dignity of the Holy Prophet (Sallallaho Alaihi Wasallam) are Qasim Nanotvi, Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi, Khalil Ahmad Ambethvi and Ashraf Ali Thanwi and all those who follow their ways.

“Almighty Allah grant Imam Ahmad Raza Khan great reward for he has given cure and has answered his decree which is in his book, “Al Mu’tamadul Mustanad”, in which are also the decrees of the Ulema of Mecca and Medina. Due to the corruption and trouble, it has become necessary for them as they (the misguided) are spreading corruption on this earth. They and all those on their path.”

Umar bin Hamadan Almahrasi, Servant at the Masjid-e-Nabawi wrote: “After pace and salutations, I put my sight on the book of a learned person on this earth. He has widened the path of knowledge and, in it (the book) made obvious every interpretation and utterance in his clearly convincing and sufficient arguments. He is Hadrat Ahmad Raza Khan on whose name is “Al Mu’tamadul Mustanad”.

“May Almighty Allah protect his life and always keep him happy. Now, that which is in refutal of those people, cursed and evil Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani, who is the Dajjal Kazzab of the last decade. Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi and Khalil Ahmad Ambethvi and Ashraf Ali Thanwi, degrading and insulting Nabi (Sallallaho Alaihi Wasallam). Then, it is no doubt that they are kafirs and those who have the power to execute them, then it is necessary for them to do so, to give them the death sentence.”

Over two hundred such Fatawa have been compiled by Ala-Hazrat (rahmatullah alaih) himself under the word famous title “Hussamul Haramain”.

Molvi Ibham is such a shameless creature that he never leaves any stone unturned to tarnish the image of Ala-Hazrat Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih).

“Another claim is Ahmed Raza Khan writes, “Hazrat Syyadina Aaisha, Ummatul Momineen (RA) inflatiously clothed her. Her tight fitting clothes, revealed the robust and the youthful gestures of her body. With protruding breasts and jetting bust, and this were searing my thoughts and tearing away at my heart.” (Hidaayat Bakshish, Vol. 3, p.37)

He is referring to an old edition of the collection of eulogies written by Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih). The press where the third volume of Hadaeq-e-Bakhshish was printed belonged to a Deobandi. He was such a sworn enemy of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) that he managed to add some sub-standard couplets to the poem in praise of Hazrat Bibi Ayesha (radi Allahu anha) and published the book. When the book came in the market, the Deobandi made it an issue and levelled charges of blasphemy against Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih). Anybody who goes through the contents of the book can easily make out the vast difference between the style of Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih) and the addition inserted by the Deobandi conspirators. Any logical mind would conclude as to how a scholar so careful like Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih) could dig up his own grave by composing derogatory couplets. It was a planned conspiracy and even today the enemies of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) produce the copies of that edition to degrade the great Muhaddith of Bareilly.

Molvi Ibham comments: “Is this not the work of a perverted mind of sexual sawdust of a man who sees himself with absolute arrogance and total pride and indulgence.”

I sympathize with the members of the audience of this wretched Molvi, who really have to face a torture while listening to such an illiterate, third class man.

In his next jump of lie, Molvi Ibham writes: “His followers write, “Ahmed Raza Khan is innocent, and free of all sins.”

But this time the wretched man does not give any reference. It seems he has signed a contract of falsity in his words and letters. He is very swift in his conclusions. First he levels a false charge against Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) and immediately he derives a conclusion: “In other word he’s similar to the Ambia.”

“The Imam of the Berelwis, Ahmed Raza Khan is free of faults, and Allah is highly pleased and satisfied with Ahmed Raza Khan, from the beginning to the end.”

I don’t know as to from where Molvi Ibham has lifted this excerpt. He has a further objection that the followers of Imam Ahmad Raza use “Radiallaho Anho” as a suffix to his name. Here is another typical example of the moral bankruptcy of Molvi Ibham. He misquotes: “Rasullullah (SAW) is a prophet unto the Arabs and Ahmed Raza Khan is the prophet unto the Non-Arabs. When I went to Arabia and envision its scope and magnitude, I realized without a doubt that he (Ahmed Raza Khan) was the qibla of the non-Arab people,” written by Shah Abdul Alim Sidduque in Savennai of Ala Hazrat p. 148”

This is a false allegation against the internationally acclaimed Sunni scholar Hazrat Maulana Abdul Alim Siddiqui (rahmatullah alaih). He was a theologian par excellence. He toured around the world to propagate Islam in the remotest areas where no Muslim scholar dared to venture. Hundreds of thousands of non-believers embraced Islam under his guidance. How could a responsible Sunni scholar like Maulana Abdul Alim Siddiqui (rahmatullah alaih) adjudge Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih)as the prophet of non-Arabs. The phrase ‘the Qibla of the non-Arab people’ has got a very different connotation, as the Qibla is the direction of the right path. Imam Ahmad Raza was the guide, the mentor, the teacher, friend and philosopher for hundreds of thousands of Sunni Muslims throughout the world. His writings, his books and his disciples preached Islam among the world community. It was Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih) who was equally respected by the Arabs and non-Arabs.

Here are some titles bestowed upon him by the noble Ulema of Mecca Mukarramah:

A Coolness for the eyes of the Ulema.
A Beloved and accepted slave of Almighty Allah.
A Leader of Ulema.
The Seal of great Islamic research scholars.
The Mujaddid of this Century.

These titles are recorded in the books “Al Fuyuzaatul Makkiyah”, “Hussamul Haramain” and “Ad-Daulatul Makkiyah.”
Some titles bestowed upon him by the noble Ulema of Madina Munawarah:

The Leader among Imams.
The Leader among Mystics.
The Pride of great preceding Ulema and the leader of future Ulema.
The Mujaddid of this Ummah.
A Judge among Islamic Judges.
The Imam among Scholars of Ahadith.
The Destroyer of Bid’at and the Upholder of Sunnah.
The Mujaddid of this Century.

These titles too are recorded in the books quoted above.

Now I invite my readers to peruse another piece of literature created by Molvi Ibham: This claim of Shah Abdul Alim Sidduque influenced Ahmed Raza Khan that he present him with an expensive Jubha gown, and bestowed his khilafat upon him. This claim made Ahmed Raza Khan equivalent to Rasullullah (SAW), by declaring him to hold the same designation and status to all the Non-Arab Muslims of the world. This claim made Ahmed Raza Khan status more higher then the status of Nabi (SAW), because there are more non-Arabs in the world then Arabs. The Berelwi believe this, they don’t reveal this. It’s because if they reveal to you, you would never allow them to come close to you. The daleel of proof is the hatred of the Arabs. Even they hate Nabi (SAW), because he is an Arab.

Since Molvi Ibham has no concept of the institution of Bai’at, he does not understand the significance of presenting the gown by the Peer or Murshid to the Mureed or Khalifa. Molvi Ignorant has confined the word Khilafat to the Khilafat-e-Raashida only. Khalifa mean vice-regent, i.e., a person who acts on behalf of the chief in his absence. This has been the tradition of Sufis that they appoint their vice-gerents and ask them to go to a particular area and serve the mankind. This typical tradition started right from the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) who appointed Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddique (radi Allahu anhu) as his vice-regent to lead the Islamic army. The Khilafat of spiritual order continued. Hazrat Ali (radi Allahu anhu) made Hazrat Hasan Basari (alaihir rahmah) his Khalifa who took Bai’at of Muslims on his behalf. There are certain spiritual orders which descend through Hazrat Hasan Basari (alaihir rahmah); the others through Imam Husain (radi Allahu anhu). The Peer and Khalifa tradition is still continuing.

Molvi Ibham, as usual, derived a quick conclusion that Imam Ahmad Raza’s (rahmatullah alaih) presenting a gown to Hazrat Abdul Alim Siddiqui (rahmatullah alaih) represented his claim of being equivalent to the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam). “This claim made Ahmed Raza Khan status more higher then the status of Nabi (SAW), because there are more non-Arabs in the world then Arabs.” What an absurd logic! Molvi Ibham, who vehemently believes that the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) had no knowledge of the Unseen, himself claims to know what is hidden in the hearts of the Barelwis. That is why he says: “The Berelwi believe this, they don’t reveal this.”

If the Barelwis do not reveal their belief, how that idiot Molvi came to know that the Barelwis treat Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih) on par with the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam). “Even they hate Nabi (SAW), because he is an Arab.”

This is real news to me! The Deoband school of thought openly blames the Barelwis that they are so much exaggerating their love and respect towards the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) that it reaches to the level of love and respect towards Allah. And now this wretched Molvi says that the Barelwis hate the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam). I think either everything has gone wrong with the brain of Ibrahim Adam, or a mad dog has bitten him. Even Molvi Ashraf Ali Thanwi recognized Imam Ahmad Raza’s (rahmatullah alaih) immense love towards the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam). It was Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) who showed the Muslim world how to respect the descendants or family of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam).

The most illiterate and illogical Molvi of our times, Molvi Ibrahim Adam goes on scanning his charge sheet against the followers of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih). He charges them with: “ – the general dislike of everything belonging to the Arab Muslim.”It seems Molvi Ibham holds the secrets of the Barelwis. Hence he knows so many things about them – their likes and dislikes; their love and hatred etc. The very intention of Molvi Ibham in putting forth the above statement is to create a feeling of hatred and enmity among the Arab Muslims against the followers of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih). This is what the Tablighi Jama’at, the Jama’at-e-Islami and other anti-Sunni outfits in the Indo-Pak sub-continent have been doing for the last so many years. A few years ago, the Deobandi school of thought clandestinely managed to poison the minds of the Saudi authorities to impose a ban on “Kanzul Imaan”, the Urdu translation of the Holy Qur’an rendered by Ala-Hazrat Imam Ahmad Raza Khan(rahmatullah alaih). There is a perennial campaign in the Deobandi camp to suppress the Maslak-e-Ala-Hazrat (rahmatullah alaih), which represents the real Islam as expounded by the companions of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) and their followers.

The Deobandi camp is in fact a division of the bigger Wahabi or Najdi campaign to suppress those who are the real slaves and staunch lovers of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) and his vice-regents. The Najdi bosses have purchased some agents from among the Muslims of the Sub-Continent and have appointed them to make false propaganda against the righteous Muslims. Ibrahim Adam is also one of these paid agents.

Molvi Ibham’s next concern is that the followers of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) “- never pray salaat behind Arab Imam, whether it is Masjid-e-Haraam or Masjid-e-Nabwi”. Yes, it is hundred per cent true. The reason is that Muqtadi’s wavelength should match with that of his Imam. The Imams of Masjid-e-Haram and Masjid-e-Nabawi are appointed by the Najdi authority and it is equally a known fact that these Imams have the following of Ibn-e-Taymiyah and Muhammad Ibn-e-Abdul Wahhab Najdi who are well known for their disbelief and derogatory remarks against the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) and his followers.

Dear readers! I would like you to peruse the following and judge for yourself whether the protagonists of such beliefs are Muslims in the real sense?

Wahhabi/Deobandi beliefs regarding Allah: Allah Almighty can tell lies! Molvi Ismail Dehlavi who is one of the Deobandi scholars writes: “Allah can tell lies.” (Yak Roza Farsi, page 17-18)

Molvi Khalil Ahmad Ambethvi Deobandi says that all previous Ulema were in debate of this fact that Allah can tell lies. He writes: “The question of lying (for Allah) has just not raised now but there has always ben a debate on this issue by previous Ulema.” (Baraheen-e-Qati’a, p. 6)

Molvi Mahmood Hasan Deobandi writes: “Allah has the power to do all bad things.” (Aljahdul Mikl, p. 41)

Molvi Sanaullah Amritsari has written: “Allah Ta’ala may tell a lie, to say so is an act of faith.” (Akhbar-e-Ehl-e-Hadith Amritsari, p. 2)

Abusive Language for the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam): Molvi Ismail Dehlavi (slaughtered) has written: “The prophets and Awliya have authority (in the worldly affairs) with the blessings (and permission) of Allah – and they are our intercessors and pleaders in the Court of Allah – all such (beliefs) are Shirk and absolute nonsense.” (Taqviyat-ul-Imaan, p. 13)

He further writes: “Despite of considering them (the prophets and Awliya) as the servants of Allah, whoever believes the prophets and Awliya as his/her helper and intercessor becomes like Abu Jahl in the matters of Shirk.” (Ibid. p. 14)

Prophets and Satan are equal in knowing the Unseen: Molvi Ismail Dehlavi has written: “And about this subject (mysticism of the Unseen) there is no difference between the Prophets and Awliya, Jinn, Shaitaan, ghosts and fairies.” (Ibid. P.14)

Deobandi’s most respected noble Hakimul Ummat, Molvi Ashraf Ali Thanwi writes: “To express a definite opinion about having Ilm-e-Ghaib (Knowledge of the Unseen) by his gracious personality (the Holy Prophet) is correct. Then let us enquire whether it means partial knowledge of the unseen or total knowledge of the Unseen? If it means the partial knowledge of the unseen, then what is so special about Huzoor (the Holy Prophet) because such (partial) knowledge of the unseen is proved for Zayd, Amr, even for children and madmen and animals and beasts.” (Hifzul Imaan, p. 15)

Disgraced worse than a cobbler: Molvi Ismail Dehlavi writes: “This should be believed that each creation whether large or small, in front of Allah’s dignity is disgraced worse than a cobbler.” (Ibid. p. 18)

Prophets are powerless and ignorant: Molvi Ismail Dehlavi writes: “There is no greatness in the fact that prophets and Awliya have attained from Allah, the knowledge to use some of their power to the degree that, whoever they like they can finish off, or give children, or free them from difficulties, or fulfill wishes, or give victory or defeat, or make someone rich or poor, or take someone’s throne off them, or put faith (Imaan) in someone’s heart, or heal a sick person, or take someone’s health from them, in all these facts all creations large or small are equal – completely powerless and humble.” (Ibid. p. 24)

Prophets are our elder brothers: Molvi Ismail Dehlavi writes: “Prophets, Awliya, Imams, spiritual leaders, martyrs meaning every one of Allah’s close servants are all human beings and humble servants, and all creations are brothers, but these have been given greatness and so are our elder brothers.” (Ibid. p.44)

Hazrat Muhammad will die and turn into soil: Molvi Ismail Dehlavi has reported the Holy Prophet to have said: “One day I will die and my body will turn into soil (ashes).” (Ibid. p.45)

Deobandi scholars are the Prophet’s tutors: Molvi Khalil Ahmad Ambethvi writes: “One righteous person meets the Holy Prophet in his dream. He notes that the Prophet is talking in Urdu language. So he asked him, ‘How did you learn this language while you are an Arab?’ The Holy Prophet replied: ‘Since I have been involved with Madarsa Darul Uloom Deoband, I have learnt this language.’ Subhanallah, this clearly indicates the integrity of this Darul Uloom.” (Baraheen-e-Qati’a.)

Denial of the Last Prophet: Molvi Qasim Nanotvi, the founding father of Darul Uloom Deoband writes: “If at all some prophet comes after the Holy Prophet’s era, it would not make any difference to the status of the Holy Prophet as the Seal of prophets.” (Tahzeerunnas, p. 25)

It was this vague statement which later encouraged Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani to declare himself as a prophet in the form of Promised Maseeh.

Satan comes in the form of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam): The most recognized Mujaddid of the Wahabis and Deobandis, Ibn-e-Taymiyya writes: “Angels don’t help anybody in Shirk, not in life or in death, nor do they like to do so. However, Satan sometimes does help and comes in the form of a human being and makes himself visible to them so that they see him with their eyes and sometimes Satan says to them, “I am Abraham, I am Jesus, I am Muhammad, I am Khizr, I am Abu Bakr, I am Umar, Usman, Ali or such and such Sheikh etc.” (Kitabul Wasilah, p.41)

A thought of the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) during the Salaah invalidates Salaah: Molvi Ismail Dehlavi writes: In Namaz thought of intercourse with your wife or evil temptation of adultery is better, and to think about a Shaikh or a pious person even thinking about the Holy Prophet is much worse than thinking of your own donkey or oxen.” (Siraat-e-Mustaqeem, Farsi, p.86)

Call the Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) for help is Shirk: Molvi Ismail Ghaznawi writes: “Whoever says Ya Rasoolallah or Ya Ali or Ya Ibne Abbas or Ya Abdul Qadir Jilani or some other wali’s name or cries for their mercy and by this call they want their help and attention which is not in anyone’s power except Allah, for example to heal a sick person, to win over an enemy or stay away from bad times etc. So in these situations to ask for anyone’s help except from Allah is Shirk (to associate with Allah) and whoever does this is a Mushrik. This is Shirk-e-Akbar and they have reached that degree. It does not matter if their belief is that it is through Allah or in fact really Allah that is helping them and this is just a way of getting to Allah, in other words all this is Shirk and to kill such a person is allowed and to rob their possessions is also allowed.” (Tohfa-e-Wahhabiyyah, originally written by Suleman bin Sehman Najdi and translated in Urdu by Ismail Ghaznawi p. 59)

Visiting Holy Prophet’s (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) Grave is the same as adultery: Deobandi Molvi Husain Ahmad Madani writes about the Wahabis and their beliefs and stating how he opposes these beliefs. He states that the Wahabis have written: “Wahabis classify a pilgrimage to Madina Munawarah (with the intention to visit the Holy Prophet’s sacred shrine as an adultery.” (Ash-Shahabus Saaqib, p. 46)

A stick is more beneficial than the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam): Molvi Husain Ahmad Madani has reported that the Saudi Wahabis have written: “A stick in our hands is more profitable to us than the Holy Prophet at least we can get rid of dogs with it, we can’t even do that with the Holy Prophet.” (Ash-Shahabus Saaqib, p. 47)

Demolition of the Prophet’s (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) Grave is Wajib: Nawab Siddique Hasan Bhopali writes: “Whatever that has been made in the form of a grave and which is of course against Shariat is forbidden and to demolish them down to earth’s level is Wajib for all Muslims without any concession, whether it is a Prophet’s grave or of any other person”. (Urf al Jadi Farsi version, p. 60)

Dear Readers! I have taken much of your precious time but it was necessary for me to present to you the false ideologies and disbelief of the Wahabis and Deobandis whom Molvi Ibham, in his asinine ecstasy is giving a clean chit and regarding, rather adoring them, as his spiritual leaders.

Now I come to the concluding part of the lecture of Molvi Bla-Bla. He has a satanic instinct in his blood, which he might have inherited from his ancestors, to level baseless charges without putting forth any evidence or documentary proof. Molvi Ibham appears to me as a daydreamer who perceives so many falsities through his perverted imagination, which lacks the faculty of reasoning. The following paragraph from his lecture is an ample proof of this.

“They say Rasul of Allah (SAW) did not complete his mission, they believe he left some points of achievements for others such as Ahmed Raza Khan. Ahmed Raza Khan fulfilled his task magnificently,”

Let Molvi Ibham produce single evidence to the effect that any of the followers of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) has written that the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) did not complete his mission and that he left some tasks to be performed and achieved by Ahmad Raza Khan. Molvi Ibham must surely be having the list of the tasks, which the Holy Prophet (sallal laahu alaihi wasallam) left undone. Can he present the list? If Molvi Ibham presents a single evidence to this effect, once again, I am ready to pay him one lakh rupee cash as a reward.

Another wild allegation by Molvi Ibham: – “There was a milad shariff majlis, when the crowd had gathered, a snake appeared and quickly slithered into a position below the mimber. As long as he majlis carried on, it kept on listening. When the Milad majlis ended, the snake went away. It harmed no one, neither coming nor leaving. People desired to kill it. Mirza Saheb reported it, (a Berelwi) he restrained them from such an action, from killing the snake. He regarded the snake as an official guest, meaning the Prophet. So on one should not kill it.” Malfoozaat Vol. 4 P.36

They say this is how Nabi (SAW) comes in many forms in their majlises (gatherings).

As I have told earlier, Molvi Ibham is quite at home in deriving silly conclusions and then attributing them to the followers of Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih). The above excerpt is also one such idiotic conclusion. He goes on guessing things.

Molvi Ibham has presented himself as an authority on Barelwism. The way he has misquoted the sayings and writings of Barelwi Ulema, indicates as if Molvi Ibham has studied this school of thought very closely.

“The Berelwi write in their final writing and that is the sun has sat on Islam and it’s Prophet and that it has risen on its teaching of Ahmed Raza Khan and it’s called Berelwism. They say it’s naturally for the sun to set, and the sun of Nabi (SAW) has sat, and the sun of Ahmed Raza Khan has risen”.

One of my friends saw the writings of Molvi Ibham and remarked: Who is this idiot that does not know even the basics of English grammar? I pacified my friend by saying: He is the Abu Jahl of our times. I should not have given any response to this ignorant man, but I thought that if I keep silence, his writings would create doubts in the minds of righteous Muslims and confuse them about the great theologian of the East, Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) of Bareilly.

I invoke Allah, to save the believers from the falsities of the disciples of Shaitaan like this Ibrahim. May Allah Almighty fill the grave of Imam Ahmad Raza (rahmatullah alaih), the Muhaddith of Bareilly with Noor and heighten his status among the followers of the Holy Prophet. May Allah accept the valuable services rendered by Imam Ahmad Raza Khan (rahmatullah alaih) to save the Islamic faith from the dirty clutches of Deobandis and Wahabis. O Allah! Lead us to Straight path; Path of those whom Thou hath favoured; Not the path of those who earned Thine wrath and went astray. Ameen.

Source:

Links on that Topic :
http://www.raza.org.za/the_mujaddid_imam_ahmed_raza_childhood.html

I Recite only the Ahl as Sunnah Scholars Opinions


Knowledge of the Deen al Haqq
by Shaykh Habib Ahmad

• Prophet Muhammad (saws) said: „Seeking Knowledge is obligatory upon every Muslim.“ (Related by Ibn ‚Adiyy, Al-Bayhaqi & Al-Tabarani)

• Though this Hadith is known and memorised by most Muslims, the essence, the amount, and the kind of knowledge referred to in this Hadith remains misunderstood by many.
• If it is true that the knowledge incumbent upon every Muslim pertains to religious knowledge, or al-‚Ilm al-Shar’i, how deeply does one have to pursue his quest of this knowledge to fulfil his duties and discharge the learning obligations placed upon him? In other words, what are the minimum teachings that every Muslim – male or female – is required to know about his Deen?
Muslim scholars classify knowledge into two categories:
Obligatory Knowledge (fardh ‚ayn)

• This refers to knowledge of the fundamentals of Islamic beliefs which every Muslim must know Seeking this knowledge is an obligatory duty upon every Muslim. All obligatory knowledge deal exclusively with al-‚Ilm al-Shari’i, that is, knowledgepertaining to Islamic faith, acts of worship, and the necessary transaction in the daily dealing of a Muslim.

• This is not a duty required of every individual, but rather it falls upon the community as a whole. Hence, if a group of individuals in the community undertake to acquire this kind of knowledge, all other individuals will be exempted from this duty, and the whole community will be free from responsibility or negligence to acquire this kind of knowledge. Examples of such knowledge include studying Islamic law and other basic sciences, industries and professions which are vital for the welfare of the society.

• Unlike obligatory knowledge, optional knowledge covers part of Islamic knowledge and all worldly knowledge. The former is called al-‚Ilm al-Shar’i al Kifa’i (optional Islamic knowledge), while the latter is called al-Ilm al-dunyawi (worldly knowledge).

• Religious sciences: These cover all branches of Islamic Shariah, such as: tafsir (Qur’anic exegeses), fiqh, hadith sciences (known as mustalah al-hadith or ‚Ilm usul al-hadith), seerah (the Prophet’s biography), Islamic political science, (As-siyasah al-shar’iyah), Islamic history, etc.

Tränen für Syrien :Spendenaktion

Veröffentlicht: 29. Januar 2013 in Spendenaktionen

Dieser You Tube Trailer steht im Zusammenhang mit einer großen Spendenaktion,nähere Infos folgen, inscha Allah :